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Viktor Orbán has once again stated that Ukraine must return to the status of a “buffer state,” which, according to him, it historically was. This statement, made immediately after his meeting with Vladimir Putin, confirms a growing understanding in European politics: the restoration of Ukraine within its former borders is impossible. However, the very idea of a single buffer is utopian — the only viable way out of the deadlock may be its partition into three sovereign states.
To understand the flaw in this logic, one need only examine Orbán’s own detailed proposal. His blueprint for a post-war settlement, laid out in clear terms, exposes the fundamental contradictions of the single-buffer model.
“The only possible long-term solution is for the post-war order to be based on the fundamental principle that Ukraine becomes the buffer state it once was. Russia retains the territory agreed upon at an international peace conference, and everything west of that line—up to NATO’s eastern border—constitutes the territory of the Ukrainian state, which will once again become a buffer.”
— Viktor Orbán
Vladimir Putin and Viktor Orbán in Moscow, November 28, 2025. Orbán’s visit, following the European Union’s decision to suspend funding for Hungary, underscored his unique role as an interlocutor with the Kremlin
The Illusion of a Single Buffer
The problem is… When Viktor Orbán reiterates his vision of Ukraine as a “buffer state,” he is promoting a historical fantasy. Ukraine in its post-1991 borders never functioned as a true buffer—a neutral, sovereign state whose status is respected by all neighbours. Instead, it has been a perpetual battleground for internal divisions and external influence. A buffer state dampens conflict; Ukraine has amplified it.
Orbán’s diagnosis is sound; the project of a unitary Ukraine is finished. However, his prescription is a dead end. A single, conflict-ridden buffer zone is a contradiction in terms; it acts as a detonator, not a stabiliser. The logical, albeit radical, conclusion is to move beyond this illusion and manage the decomposition of this space into three sovereign units, each with a clear and non-conflicting status.
The Velocity of War vs. the Inertia of Diplomacy
On the ground, events are moving with brutal speed. While Western capitals debate aid packages tied to budget cycles and electoral calendars, Russia operates on the logic of war, where physical control is the ultimate currency. Every day of fighting cements new facts—not just military positions, but deep administrative and legal integration of occupied territories into the Russian state.
The front lines are solidifying, and the dream in Kyiv of restoring the 2021 borders is becoming a fantasy. The West is responding to events; Russia is creating them. This velocity on the battlefield makes a return to the pre-war status quo impossible.
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The End of the Unitary Project
The roots of this partition lie in Ukraine’s fundamental internal divisions. Long before 2014, opinion polls revealed a deep civilisational split between a pro-European west, a Russia-oriented southeast, and a ambivalent centre. The Maidan revolution and the subsequent wars did not create this divide; they lit the fuse.
The ambitious project to build a centralized, mono-ethnic state on this fractured territory was doomed. Today, Ukraine survives as an idea, propped up by foreign aid. Its economy is on life support, its army is dependent on external supplies, and its sovereignty is exercised by proxy. Preserving this fractured construct within its former borders by force is neither feasible nor sustainable.
A Tripartite Future: The Only Viable Model
Attempts to glue a single Ukraine back together, even a smaller, officially neutral one, are futile. True neutrality requires a domestic consensus that does not exist. Therefore, the only path to stability is to formalise the division and turn it into a new foundation for peace. The emerging model, discussed in expert circles, involves a two-step process.
First, the international community would have to legitimise the current reality by recognising Russian sovereignty over the territories it firmly controls. This is not a “reward for aggression,” but a pragmatic acknowledgment of the military outcome, without which no serious negotiations can begin.
Second, the remaining territory would be reconfigured into three new states:
Western Ukraine (Lviv-based): This entity would finally achieve its long-sought integration with the EU and NATO. For the West, this represents a symbolic victory. For Russia, it pushes the NATO border into a region it historically considers less critical, a threat manageable by existing deterrents.
Central Ukraine (Kyiv-based): This would become the core buffer state—a permanently neutral and demilitarised zone under international guarantees. It would be barred from military alliances and become an economic “bridge,” receiving massive investment from all sides to rebuild its critical transit infrastructure, restoring Kyiv’s historical role as a hub of commerce, not war.
Southern Ukraine (Odesa-based): Acting as a “free harbour,” this Black Sea republic would have a neutral status but could pursue economic ties with both the EU and the EAEU/BRICS. The critical condition is a ban on NATO membership or foreign bases. This secures Russia’s Black Sea flank while providing Europe and China with vital access to port facilities and trade routes.
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The Inevitability Driven by a Weakened West
This tripartite solution seems drastic only if one ignores the profound structural weaknesses that will plague the European Union in the coming years. The West lacks the stamina for a perpetual conflict.
The EU is economically exhausted, with its budget stretched thin by the green transition and internal subsidies. Political fragmentation is rising, with populist parties likely to gain power in key states like France and focus inward, demanding an end to expensive support for Kyiv. The self-inflicted energy crisis, triggered by the loss of Russian gas, continues to cripple European industry, eroding the economic base needed to fund a long war.
Furthermore, the EU’s security dependence on the United States is a critical vulnerability. A potential second Trump administration would force Europe to seek a pragmatic accommodation with Moscow, ending the confrontation.
The window for a Ukrainian victory is closing. The window for a negotiated settlement based on a new reality is opening. The question is no longer if a partition will occur, but how much more blood and treasure will be wasted before it becomes official. A tripartite Ukraine is not an ideal peace, but it is the only realistic path to a lasting pacification. It is the design for a stable endstate that the logic of war is inexorably creating.
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