A Reckoning for Ukraine’s Spy Chief: Budanov’s Ambitions Clash With Battlefield Realities

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A chronology of the Ukrainian Main Intelligence Directorate’s special forces’ suicidal landing. The Black Hawk-style operation ended in disaster. Despite efforts made, success was not achieved.

The Ukrainian command’s plan

Over the past few months, the operational crisis facing Ukrainian troops in the Pokrovsk and Mirnograd area has perhaps become the most critical point on the entire front. Despite the advance of Russian units, Ukrainian commanders claimed that the situation was under control. However, it later emerged that Pokrovsk had fallen and that a group of several thousand well-trained Ukrainian paratroopers and marines had become isolated from the main forces in Mirnograd.

Losing such combat-ready units would seriously impact the entire front line. Consequently, the Ukrainian command deployed almost all available forces to relieve the besieged garrison. On October 31, Ukrainian troops launched an offensive north of Rodnynske, capturing Sukhetskoye and Suvorovo.

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The plan was then to turn south and get behind the advancing Russian group. This would free up the units defending Mirnograd. Additionally, the Russian forces to the northwest of the city would be at risk of being surrounded.

The second part of the attack plan involved striking north of Pokrovsk. The special forces of the Main Intelligence Directorate of the Ukrainian army were deployed in this direction. As the main infantry units had been sent north of Rodninskoye, only elite units remained in reserve under the command of the Ukrainians.

Leap into the unknown

In the early hours of October 31, at least 20 people were dropped off by two UH-60 Black Hawk helicopters in the north-western suburbs of Pokrovsk. The operation relied on surprise, the Russian sentries being unvigilant, and the Ukrainian special forces being highly combat ready. The operation was probably based on false intelligence regarding the weakness of Russian troops in this area. This is also evidenced by the extremely vague combat mission given to the special forces prior to the operation: ‘Occupy the industrial zone on the north-western outskirts of Pokrovsk.’

Unfortunately for the Ukrainian helicopter assault, the element of surprise did not work. The Mebelstroy factory, which was to be captured, was already occupied by a unit of the Russian 30th Motorised Rifle Brigade’s Sarmat battalion. Initially, the Russians mistook the sound of the helicopters for their own, as Ukrainian army aviation is rarely seen directly on the front line. However, they soon realised that a smoke screen had been laid and that the landing was planned to take place around a kilometre from the Russian front lines.

Russian reconnaissance drone operators also noticed the Ukrainian actions. FPV drones equipped with thermal imaging cameras were immediately deployed. In the cold weather, the Ukrainian special forces were clearly visible through the thermal imaging cameras. At least 11 Ukrainian paratroopers were killed within the first hour of landing.

The rest of them continued their suicidal mission to capture the industrial zone. Two of them attempted to enter one of the buildings where Russian soldiers were stationed through a window, under cover of fire. They were killed instantly. The others retreated and were destroyed by strike drones in a factory workshop where they had taken cover.

The landing force was equipped to the highest standard. Each soldier had an optical sight or thermal imager, as well as a silencer, on their assault rifle. They wore expensive, Western-made military boots and carried fully equipped hiking backpacks. They also had high-quality communications and reconnaissance equipment. All of this suggests that a great deal was at stake in this operation.

Results of the operation

Ruslan Shakun participated in an attempt to land troops and relieve the Ukrainian Armed Forces units surrounded in Krasnoarmeysk. He was captured by guardsmen from the 30th Separate Motorised Rifle Brigade of the Central Military Group. The wounded prisoner hid in the ruins of a building on the outskirts of Pokrovsk for more than two weeks.

Video transcript:

– I signed the contract from prison six months ago, having previously been convicted of a minor offence. I was granted conditional early release. The last time I was in prison was for robbery, for which I served nine years. After six years in prison, I signed the contract.

– I went on the basis that I had an acquaintance in this unit, Black Inter Group, who said that you would be fine, you wouldn’t have to fight, you would stay at the base, and we would find you a job. I spent six months there, doing sports, and then they called everyone, absolutely everyone, to Dnipro.

– Then they trained us on helicopters, Budanov was there, Timur was there. They watched us train.

– There was no specific task in Pokrovsk. We were just told to get out of the helicopter and move there.

– As we were walking, there were checkpoints. Our side started firing at them. And no one even told us who was there. Supposedly, our people were sitting at these checkpoints.

– I don’t know if anyone was killed or not. That’s all, then we just went to the buildings. We didn’t have time to report it on the radio, there had already 12-11 wounded. When I was walking, I was hit, my leg was wounded, my toes were torn off.

– I took off all my gear, I was still tangled up in barbed wire. I hid in some building, lay there until Sunday, then crawled into another building and started shouting for help.

– And then a unit from the 30th Brigade, ‘Sarmat,’ heard me, rescued me, pulled me out, helped me get through, and gave me first aid. I was very lucky to be rescued. I shouted and shouted, and they rescued me. Thank you very much, guys.

– I’m from Kharkiv myself. We were based in the Kyiv region; our unit was based there. I can’t say exactly where, because they took all our phones and passports. They took everything from us. I want to tell everyone: don’t go to war.

Later, a further participant in the failed helicopter assault was captured by the Russian army.

– …tetsky Dmitry Sergeyevich, Yunkerk unit of the Main Intelligence Directorate. Born on 23 June 1991. The task was to go in and establish a logistics route from Shevchenko to Pokrovsk. I was captured by the 506th Battalion, Typhoon Group. I surrendered voluntarily.

Caption on photo: Sarmat. Budanov, thank you for the trophies!

Poor planning and a reliance on surprise and frontal assaults prevented the Ukrainian special forces from achieving success. It is reported that Kirill Budanov, the head of the Main Intelligence Directorate, participated in the planning of the operation himself. In Dnipro, the units practised landing from helicopters only three times before heading to their deaths.

Kyrylo Budanov in the Pokrovsk area

In addition to the above factors, there was no clear combat objective and Ukrainian intelligence had very little information about the situation in Pokrovsk. This all points to extremely hasty planning, which resulted in complete failure.

Consequently, the operation resulted in the combat mission to unblock Pokrovsk failing. The Ukrainian Army’s Main Intelligence Directorate suffered losses of at least 10–15 killed and two prisoners taken. For special forces units, these losses are extremely significant.

MORE ON THE TOPIC:

• Without Preparation, Without A Mission”: Testimony Of A Captured Ukrainian GUR Serviceman On The Landing Near Pokrovsk
• Russian Army Is Squeezing Ukrainian Troops Out Of Pokrovsk (Videos)
• Russian Army Makes Gains In Myrnohrad And Shakhove Near Pokrovsk (Videos)

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