ILLUSTRATIVE IMAGE
Written by Alex Gallant exclusively for SouthFront
UPDATED ON FEBRUARY 13, 2022
Following the demise of the Islamic State in Iraq and Syria since its peak in 2015, the terrorist haven that nurtured the recent rise of global extremism seems to have migrated to the African continent, in countries such as Mali, Kenya, Nigeria and Ethiopia. Using the Armed Conflict Location and Event Data (ACLED) Project, it is shown that between 2015 and 2020, the number of attacks against civilians in Africa was 18x higher, with 381 attacks in 2015, against 7,108 in 2020. The total number of fatalities also followed that trend, with 1,394 fatalities in 2015, against a number 9x higher in 2020, with 12,519 fatalities.
Highway to Indoctrination
To introduce this topic, we believe it necessary to revisit the different factors that support the growth of extremist ideologies. This short introduction might help us put light on the current geopolitical situation on the African continent. Although every group usually isn’t born from a perfectly similar formula, common socio-political factors can be found and possibly act as fertilizer for violent extremist movements.
In a study from the U.S. Government in 2012, the following factors have been argued to support the rise of insurgencies. Although not all of them are simultaneously required to encourage the appearance of internal conflicts, the more factors a country experiences is certainly increasing the risk-percentage of a surge. Also, it is to be understood that some factors will, by nature, promote the emergence of other elements listed below. These “ingredients” will thus be considered throughout this analysis to support the claims put forth:
- History of internal conflict;
- Conflict in neighboring states leading to an increase of foreign refugees;
- Societal factors, such as a strong warrior or conspiratorial culture;
- Inhospitable terrain, such as jungles, mountains, swamps, that can be used by insurgents to move, hide, train and organize;
- Polarized politics that leads to government paralysis in the face of crisis due to an inability to reach consensus by government officials;
- Lack of basic services, such as health care, education, justice and security;
- Inept or corrupt security forces;
- Economic crisis, which usually provides a pool of unemployed and discontent youth ripe for recruitment;
- Window of vulnerability, such as natural disasters, political assassinations, or other situations that stretch the security
The current geopolitical situations in Africa, especially in countries like Mali, Burkina Faso, Niger, Central African Republic (CAR) and Ethiopia, followed these trends and, consequently, plowed fertile ground to the rise of insurgent groups. Although many experts argue that most of these conflicts, such as the current insurrection in the CAR, are not founded on religious ideologies, it would be naive to believe these movements are not influenced by religious non-state actors. Although for this analysis, we will not take into account the root ideology of any one movement; we will only consider the socio-political foundation that sparked the rise of the group itself.
Looking at the regional trends of the current conflicts in Africa, it can be determined there are three main geographical areas of operations. The first one is located in East Africa and includes the 30-years Somali civil war, and the Tigray War in Ethiopia; the second is around Lake Chad and Northeast Nigeria, in countries like Chad, Cameroon and Niger, with a direct impact in the CAR; the third is in the Sahel region of West Africa and includes Mali and Burkina Faso.
Although many other countries could be referred to in this analysis, only a few will be discussed.
Current Situation in Africa: Mali and Ethiopia
As previously mentioned, political instability, among other factors, created by a sustained insurrection, greatly undermines the authority of the official government and continues feeding the ideological strength of the insurgent groups. Mali, a country that had relative political improvements prior to 2012, has undergone three military coups in the last 8 years, thus perpetuating the state of instability within the country ever since .
Such as seen in Afghanistan after the vacuum left by the withdrawal of the USSR – where the Taliban’s extreme ideology annexed the country by force in order to bring political stability – the Macina Liberation Front (FLM) successfully filled the void left by the weak state of Central Mali. Since their alliance in 2017 with other groups in the Sahel, such as Al-Qaeda in
Islamic-Maghreb (AQIM), the FLM has been competing with other actors for territorial control, comprising the Islamic State in Greater Sahara and the National Movement for the Liberation of Azawad, demanding an independent Tuareg state in the Northern region.
In a paper published by Reed M. Wood and Jacob D. Kathman in 2015, it is demonstrated that violence against civilians increases when opposing factions are engaged in intergroup competitions. This increase in violence would then motivate affected civilians to join the ranks of the opposing party, thus perpetuating the cycle of violence.
‘’We argue that volatility within a conflict system contributes to an increase in civilian targeting by rebel groups. More specifically, the likelihood of a given rebel group victimizing civilians is in part a function of threat to the group’s access to necessary conflict resources, including civilian support, trade in lucrative commodities, and territory. The emergence of rival challengers represents a threat to the existing group’s market share within the conflict. The “shock” created by the entry of new actors as well as the decline in market share the new group provokes leads to a temporary increase in civilian targeting.’’
On the eastern front, the conflict in Ethiopia also brings adequate conditions for the cultivation of extremist ideologies. After tens-of-thousands of casualties, and around
half-a-million people starving in the Tigray region alone, the U.S. government decided to remove the country from the African Growth and Opportunity Act (AGOA), thereby damaging the already catastrophic economic situation of the civilian population. The AGOA brought approximately
$100 million annually to Ethiopia and provided jobs to between 100,000 and 200,000 people. The Executive Chairman of American Ethiopia Public Affairs Committee (AEPAC), Mr. Mesfin Tegenu, mentioned in an interview with Business Insider Africa in early January 2022 that:
‘’If the delisting takes effect, Ethiopia will have medium-to-long-term disadvantages. There are about 200,000 jobs that are created as a result of AGOA. These jobs-support have direct impacts on about one million Ethiopian families. So, delisting the country from AGOA simply means that those families would be negatively impacted.’’
The decision from Biden’s administration to remove Ethiopia from the AGOA comes after allegations of human rights violations by government forces towards the civilian population in the Tigray area. Human Rights Watch (HRW) claimed that the government forces allegedly ‘’committed forcible displacement, large-scale massacres, widespread sexual violence, indiscriminate shelling, pillage, and attacks on schools and hospitals.’’ Considering Ethiopia’s current state of crisis, and referring back to the different factors supporting the rise of violent extremism, the country definitely makes it to the top of the list for terrorism breeding grounds.
The French Fiasco
With France slowly leaving its African hosts’ countries, we can see the power void being filled by other Great Powers, such as China, Russia and Turkey. After Paris ended its 3 years military mission in the CAR in 2016, leaving most of the country’s security to the UN peacekeeping mission (MINUSCA), the Kremlin ambitiously turned its focus towards the resources-rich country. Following a meeting between the CAR President Faustin-Archange Touadera and the Russian Foreign Minister in 2017, 175 Russian military instructors, along with large arms shipments, were sent to the CAR to help stabilize the region. Today, the Russian government claims that no more than 550 instructors have been in the country at any one time.
However, official Russian military personnel weren’t the only ones eager to strike a deal with Bangui. The Russia-based private military corporation Wagner Group entered the theater around the same time as the Russian military themselves. The PMC group, having no official ties to Moscow, were hired by the Touadera administration to assist the CAR government’s forces establish peace and stability in the boiling countryside. Unfortunately, this somewhat fruitful collaboration has brought its fare of international concerns. In March 2021, an OHCHR working group raised questions about the ethics and methodologies of private contractors working in the CAR region:
‘’The experts have received, and continue to receive, reports of grave human rights abuses and violations of international humanitarian law, attributable to the private military personnel operating jointly with CAR’s armed forces (FACA) and in some instances UN peacekeepers.
Among the violations are reports of mass summary executions, arbitrary detentions, torture during interrogations, forced disappearances, forced displacement of the civilian population, indiscriminate targeting of civilian facilities, violations of the right to health, and increasing attacks on humanitarian actors.’’
Still tracking France’s debacles in Africa, Mali is again under the radar of political experts following the expulsion of the French ambassador, and the withdrawal of 5,000 French troops in early February 2022. The incident was sparked by alleged ‘’outrageous’’ comments from the former ambassador concerning the transitional government.
This news is uneasily welcomed considering the Malian government also announced in December 2021 its intentions to hire 1,000 operatives from the Wagner Group. This turn of events strangely resembles the situation in the CAR in 2016-2017. Although some sources argue that Wagner is already operating in the country, Minister Ibrahim Ikassa Maïga maintains its standpoint that Bamako is not currently dealing with PMCs, but exclusively with official Russian military delegues. Unfortunately, the distinction between the two entities is becoming increasingly difficult to make.
A New Terrorist Hub
To start with, we believe that we will see an expansion in Russian involvement in politically unstable countries like Burkina Faso, where, surprisingly, the Russian flag was seen waving in the hands of many demonstrators during a rally supporting the recent coup, only 24h after the army seized the presidential palace and striped the former President Roch Marc Christian Kaboré of his power. Despite the evidences that the leader of the recent coup d’état,
Lieutenant-Colonel Paul-Henri Sandaogo Damiba, tried to persuade the ex-president Roch Kaboré to hire the Wagner Group only a month prior to the events, it is still unclear if Russia currently has operatives in the country..
With a considerable proportion of Wagner’s contractors originating from Syria – cheap labor compared to the Russian veterans, though argued by some experts to be fighters from different extremist movements, e.g. Islamic State – it would not be surprising to see these operatives support and assist rebel forces in Africa for a sum much higher than their current meager allowance (as low as $30 USD a month). This influx of foreign fighters will likely expand in countries such as Mali, Burkina Faso, and the CAR, where the geopolitical “window of vulnerability” is ripe for extremists exploitation.
Similar historical patterns as the one seen today in Africa can be acknowledged in order to hypothesize future trends in conflict. The easiest and most obvious comparison that could be made with the recent extremist expansion in Sub-Saharan Africa is the state of Afghanistan post-2001 invasion.
As such, we foresee an increase in internal conflicts between legitimate government forces and rebel factions, much like we have seen between the U.S.-backed Afghan government and the Taliban party during the 20 years-war. This rise in violence will predominantly impact the civilian population, as defined by Wood and Kathman. In regions like Mali, where neighboring Burkina Faso is allowing different extremist groups to Rest and Recuperate within its borders (much like the Taliban did in Pakistan), it will be hard to reach a country-wide unified stability.
Finally, we believe a heightened rate of violence against westerners will be recorded in Africa, but also in France, the UK and the United-States. Taking into account the increasing number of foreign operatives in Africa, alongside a rising hatred for Western institutions, we forecast a new generation of global terrorism, with the future perpetrators being indoctrinated, this time, in the deep jungles and inhospitable terrains of Sub-Saharan Africa. The new hub established in these countries will surely damage the fragile socio-political systems of the host countries that support, voluntarily or not, these movements. However, it is still unclear if a Western military intervention on the continent will materialize in the near future.
