ILLUSTRATIVE IMAGE
Submitted by Dr. Binoy Kampmark
The antipodes has had a fraught relationship with the nuclear option. At the distant ends of the earth, New Zealand took a stand against the death complex, assuming the forefront of restricting the deployment of nuclear assets in its proximity. This drove Australia bonkers with moral envy and strategic fury. The New Zealand Nuclear Free Zone, Disarmament and Arms Control Act 1987 made the country a nuclear and biological weapons-free area. It was a thumbing, defiant gesture against the United States, but what is sometimes forgotten is that it was also a statement to other powers – including France – who might venture to experiment and test their weapons in the Pacific environs.
The Lange government had made an anti-nuclear platform indispensable to an independent foreign policy, one that caused a fair share of consternation in Washington. The satellite was misbehaving, and seeking to break free from its US orbit. “If we don’t pass this law, if we don’t declare ourselves nuclear free,” insisted Prime Minister David Lange, “we will have anarchy on the harbours and in the streets.”
An important provision of the Act remains clause 9(2): “The Prime Minister may only grant approval for the entry into the internal waters of New Zealand by foreign warships if the Prime Minister is satisfied that the warships will not be carrying any nuclear explosive device upon their entry into the internal waters of New Zealand.”
The reaction from the US Congress was a cool one: the Broomfield Act was duly passed in the House: an ally had been recast as a somewhat disregarding “friend”. It urged New Zealand to “reconsider its decision and law denying port access to certain US ships” and “resume its obligations under the ANZUS Treaty.” Various “security assistance and arms export preferences” to New Zealand would be suspended till the President determined that the country was compliant with the Treaty.
As Anglo-American retainer and policing authority of the Pacific, Australia has had sporadic flirts with the nuclear option, one shadowing the creation of the Australian National University, the Woomera Rocket Range and the Snowy Mountains hydro-electricity scheme. Australian territory had been used, and abused, by British forces keen to test Albion’s own acquisition of an atomic option. The Maralinga atomic weapons test range remains a poisoned reminder of that period, but was hoped to be a prelude to establishing an independent Australia nuclear force. Cooperation with Britain was to be key, and Australian defence spending, including the acquisition of 24 pricey F-111 fighter bombers from the US in the 1960s, was premised on a deliverable nuclear capability.
During John Gorton’s short stint as prime minister in the late 1960s, rudimentary efforts were made at Jervis Bay to develop what would have been a reactor capable of generating plutonium under the broad aegis of the Australian Atomic Energy Commission. Gorton’s premiership ended in 1971; Australia slid back into the sheltering comforts of Washington’s unverifiable nuclear umbrella.
The influential chairman of the AAEC, Philip Baxter, who held the reins between 1956 and 1972 with a passion for secrecy, never gave up his dream of encouraging the production of weapons grade plutonium. It led historian Ann Moyal to reflect on the “problems and danger of closed government”, with nuclear policy framed “through the influence of one powerful administrator surrounded by largely silent men”.
Nuclear weapons have a habit of inducing the worst of human traits. Envy, fear, and pride tend to coagulate, producing a nerdish disposition that tolerates mass murder in the name of faux strategy. With the boisterous emergence of China, Australian academics and security hacks have been bitten by the nuclear bug. In 2018, Stephan Frühling, Associate Dean of the College of Asia and the Pacific at the Australian National University fantasised about adorning the Australian coastline with tactical, short-range nuclear weapons.
It was a fantasy he was happy to recommend to audiences tuning in to the ABC’s Late Night Live. “In air and naval battle on the high seas, nukes can now be employed without significant risk of collateral damage much like conventional warheads.” Such thinking has the hallmarks of redux insanity in the field of nuclear thinking, the sort that deems such weapons equivalent in their characteristics to conventional types.
And what of the much vaunted US nuclear umbrella? By stepping out of it, Australia was surely making a statement of cranky independence. Frühling’s suggestion is symptomatic of a field filled with syndromes and disorders. “Before investing in a nuclear program I think we would have to make a genuine attempt at trying to draw closer to the United States and its nuclear arsenal.” By stepping out, you have to be stepping in.
His work exudes a lingering suspicion that the ANZUS treaty binding both Australia and the United States remains foamy and indistinct on the issue of territorial defence. Since Vietnam, there has been little by way of joint operations in the Pacific between the two. The treaty’s preamble outlining the allies’ need to “declare publicly and formally their sense of unity, so that no potential aggressor could be under any illusion that any of them stand alone in the Pacific Area” remains distinctly free of evidence and logistical heft.
Other authors who claim to be doyens of Australian strategic thinking also fear the seize-the-prize intentions of the Yellow Peril and a half-hearted Uncle Sam keen to look away from “the Indo-Pacific and its allies.” Paul Dibb, Richard Brabin-Smith and Brendan Sargeant, all with ANU affiliations, call for “a radically new defence policy,” which might be read as a terror of the US imperium in retreat. For Dibb, Australia “should aim for greater defence self-reliance.” This would involve “developing a Defence Force capable of denying our approaches to a well-armed adversary capable of engaging us in sustained high-intensity conflict.”
Such writings suggest an element of the unhinged at play. The paternal protector snubs the child; the child goes mad and seeks comfort in suitable toys. Brabin-Smith broods over the end of extended nuclear deterrence, “not just for us but for other US allies in the Pacific, Japan especially.” This might well precipitate nuclear proliferation in the Pacific, requiring “Australia to review its own position on nuclear weapons.”
Not wishing to be left off the increasingly crowded nuclear wagon, Australia’s long standing commentator on China, Hugh White, has also put his oar in, building up the pro-nuclear argument in what he calls a “difficult and uncomfortable” question. (Age does have its own liberating qualities.) Having suggested in 2017 that the China-US tussle in the Pacific would eventually lead to a victory for Beijing, he has his own recipe for a re-ordering of the Australian defence establishment. How to Defend Australia suggests what needs to be done and, as is the nature of such texts, what the bunglers in the security establishment are actually doing. It is also a paean about future loss. “We have been very fortunate to live under America’s protection for so long and we will sorely miss it when it is gone.”
White advocates an Australian Defence Force heavily reliant on sinking flotillas: “only ships can carry the vast amounts of material required for a major land campaign”. Sell most of the surface vessels, he urges; abandon existing plans to build more; build a fleet of 24 to 36 submarines and increase defence spending from the current levels of 2% to 3.5%.
Then comes the issue of a nuclear capability, previously unneeded given the pillowing comforts of the US umbrella, underpinned by the assurance that Washington was “the primary power in Asia”. White shows more consideration than other nuclear groupies in acknowledging the existential dangers. Acquiring such weapons would come at a Mephistophelian cost. “It would make us less secure in some ways, that’s why in some ways I think it’s appalling.”
The nuclear call doing the rounds in Canberra is a bit of old man’s bravado, and a glowering approach to the non-proliferation thrust of the current international regime. Should Australia embark on a nuclear program, it is bound to coalescence a range of otherwise divided interests across the country. It will also thrill other nuclear aspirants excoriated for daring to obtain such an option. The mullahs in Iran will crow, North Korea will be reassured, and states in the Asian-Pacific may well reconsider their benign status.
Dr. Binoy Kampmark was a Commonwealth Scholar at Selwyn College, Cambridge. He lectures at RMIT University, Melbourne. Email: bkampmark@gmail.com
Mostly rubbish, Australia arranged to buy nuclear tipped missiles from Britain in the 1960’s, the US vetoed the deal. The USA has a lot more control over Australia today, than it did back in the 1960’s, and the US would never allow Australia to have nukes. On another level, the 1969 proposal to build a nuclear power station at Jervis Bay caused such a public uproar, that no politician has dared to raise the issue since.
A cut-out cardboard condo maze Filled with an insubordinate race Irrational youths stop to stare As music rubber hosed the air
I have no problem with Australia hacing an independent policy and Anzus is toilet paper believed in by idiots and sneaks. It does not bind isramerica to help Australia at all. It only binds isramerica to talk to australia about defence. Hahah The Australians who talkedup and signed-up Anzus should be hung from the lamp-posts. Idiots or suborned traitors!
– “Airfields in the far north of Australia have been characterised in US strategic documents as “safe havens” for American aircraft, as they are beyond the range of most Chinese and North Korean missiles. F-22 stealth fighters, B2 stealth bombers, and B1 and B52 long-range strategic bombers are among the American assets that have practised operating from northern Australia.” (Australia deploys for war with North Korea and confrontation with China, By James Cogan, WSWS, 11 October 2017),
-“In many ways Australian defence policy for decades has focused very strongly on the possibility of some sort of conflict with Indonesia.” [Hugh White, Professor of Strategic Studies at the Strategic and Defence Studies Centre of the Australian National University in Canberra, Australia, long time defence and intelligence analyst]
– “defense analysts from both countries expect an increased presence in Australia for the U.S. Air Force, Navy and Marines in the form of bombers, nuclear submarines, missiles and troops…. it’s likely the Air Force will begin using runways in the northern part of the country, possibly for the B-52 strategic bomber and B-2 stealth bomber… [missile architecture] cooperation is more likely to speed up….” (Deal likely to bring more US military assets to Australia’, Stripes, June 20, 2014)
– “The US Defense Department and the Australian Defence Force are conducting a joint study into…. the feasibility of rotating an entire US aircraft carrier battle group to the port of Stirling near Perth… American long-range B-52 bombers now spend up to six months a year at airbases in Darwin and nearby Tindal…” (US military looks to expand use of Australian bases and ports, 16 February 2015), etc…..
Australia is integrated into allied military architecture and operations. In the event of any additional kinetic warfare operations of this bloc, Australia will augment offensive allied operations (as is evident through its actions).
In this context, nations identified as ‘enemies’ will likely adjust their policies and capabilities accordingly. This includes consideration of Australian moves to attain nuclear device delivery potential (nuclear devices can potentially be supplied by key allies). Indeed, the Australian procurement of military assets allowing the potential to deliver such devices (as part of allied operations) is well documented.
As a consequence of the U.S. abandonment of successive treaties to facilitate the (long planned) expansion of military/missile architecture associated with the pursuit of nuclear primacy (fast first strike potential with retaliatory missile interception capabilities), the situation is moving in the opposite direction to non-proliferation. Indeed, another missile crisis is developing as the U.S. continues to develop missile architecture that incorporates offensive potential (including nuclear potential).
– “The US withdrawal from the Intermediate Nuclear Forces (INF) treaty is raising concerns in Russia that it would lead to the deployment of land-based US missiles along their borders in Eastern Europe. Russian officials warn this could create a crisis comparable to the 1962 Cuban missile crisis….. Russian Deputy FM Sergei Ryabkov warned that such a deployment meant the situation “won’t just get more complicated, it will escalate right to the limit,”( Russia Warns US Buildup Risks Repeat of Cuban Missile Crisis, Jason Ditz, Antiwar, June 24, 2019)
– “The United States is pursuing global strategic domination through developing anti-ballistic missile systems capable of a sudden disarming strike against Russia and China, according to the deputy head of operations of the Russian General Staff….. “The presence of US missile defense bases in Europe, missile defense vessels in seas and oceans close to Russia creates a powerful covert strike component for conducting a sudden nuclear missile strike against the Russian Federation,” [Lt. Gen. Viktor] Poznikhir [Deputy Chief of the Main Operations Directorate of the Russian Armed Forces] explained….. “Applying sudden disarming strikes targeting Russian or Chinese strategic nuclear forces significantly increases the efficiency of the US missile defense system,” Poznikhir added. American ABM systems are not only creating an “illusion” of safety from a retaliatory strike but can themselves be used to launch a sneak nuclear attack on Russia. In a blatant breach of the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty, the standard land-based launching systems can be covertly rearmed with Tomahawk cruise missiles instead of interceptors…….” (US missile shield aims to cover sudden nuclear strike against Russia – General Staff, RT, 27 Apr, 2017),
– “We make no secret that we have military-technical means to neutralize the possible negative impact of the U.S. global missile defense system on the Russian nuclear forces,” [Russian Chief of Staff Valery General Gerasimov]
– “the deployment of the so-called missile defense system in Romania and Poland is essentially, among others, an indirect breach of contract for missiles with a medium range. The present anti-missile systems in Eastern Europe are based on the universal platform MK-41 and its technical specifications allow launching “Tomahawk” missiles with a range of 2 500 km at any point of the Russian European territories in violation of the prohibition of the contract. There is hardly anything that threatened world security as much as this move of Washington. Even the Cuban Missile Crisis was not charged with such a high risk level. People do not understand how potentially dangerous the situation really is. “The world is pulled into an entirely new dimension, while Washington pretends that nothing happens,” Russian President, Vladimir Putin, said, adding that Western officials “blur the eyes of the news media” which in turn misinforms their audiences.” (On the Verge of a Major War: Is There a Pilot in the Cockpit?, Southfront, 17/10/2016)
In reality, the Cold War never ended, only the format changed (Cold War attitudes and prejudices/bigotries being hardwired in many after decades of conditioning, reinforced by ongoing Western bloc media narratives). In the ongoing pursuit of global primacy (‘full spectrum dominance’) the U.S./NATO/allied bloc employed deceit successfully to dismantle the Soviet Union and subsequently integrated successive former Soviet states into the still expanding NATO military bloc in violation of former agreements (a project based on the replication of the former Soviet economic/military bloc model but in opposition to Russia). As adversarial operations are expanding/intensifying, the current situation is likely a relative calm preceding the logical progression of conflict (being escalation, a product of ongoing U.S.-NATO-allied bloc policies and actions).
Note: In addition the hypocritical position of Australia in regards to actions taken against other nations accused of developing nuclear capabilities (while ignoring allied development of nuclear capabilities/nuclear proliferation), Australian hosting of allied (nuclear capable) forces and moves towards attaining domestic nuclear device delivery potential will have significant implications for its security. It is a matter of logic that other nations will adjust their capabilities in response to changes in the military capability environment. In the unwanted but possible situation of war between opposing powers, recognition of such capabilities would influence adjustments to policies and responsive counter-measures.
Unfortunately such a situation is becoming increasingly probable (policies and actions of the U.S.-NATO-allied bloc being consistent with a posture of confrontation, this being the logic of those who seek primacy through aggressive mechanisms).