On December 27, Jaish al-Islam terrorist group announced in a video statement information about casualties of “regime forces” in clashes in the Eastern Ghouta region near the Syrian capital, Damascus.
According to Jaish al-Islam, in November, its fighters killed 250 pro-government fighters, destroyed 2 battle tankd and 4 artillery pieces belonging to the Syrian army. 12 more battle tanks and 3 BMP infantry fighting vehicles were reportedly damaged.
Jaish al-Islam didn’t provide information about its losses in November.
The terrorist group also claimed that government forces had not been able to make significant gains in the area. Nonethelles, the group was pushed to recognize that the military situation is “bad” for the so-called “opposition”.
The numbers provided by Jaish al-Islam cannot be confirmed independently and are likely over-estimated, but they show the intensity of fighting between government forces and terrorists in the area.
It’s hard to say if it’s a good tactic to allow the “rebels” to leave to Idlib or not. It might encourage them to fight till it’s completely hopeless and then get transferred. However if they are not allowed to leave they might fight till death which also could cause a lot casualties. I do however believe that the E. Ghouta battle could use some of the Russian Special forces to quickly end this (as in E. Aleppo).
The only terrorists going to Idlib are mainly foreigners or those few that decide not to surrender. It is a very good tactic to condense them in a confined area and having them surrounded makes it easy to combat them.
Yes indeed but they seem to often be the leaders and most likely are the ones pushing the rest to keep fighting while they know that they will be transferred when it’s over. As we see in E. Aleppo it was completely hopeless for the “rebels” at the end but they kept on fighting (perhaps the foreigners needed time to burn all the evidence of western involvement? (though some evidence was found)).
You leave your enemy a life of escape unless you intent to fight until death. In this case, they do have them surrounded due to logistic needs to keep them from resupply but they leave a line of retreat via bus trip. It is a smart tactic IMO because the gov would have to level everything to root them out of an urban battlefield.
No, you do NOT “leave your enemy a route of escape” when you have him surrounded – you attack him from all sides until he is either completely annihilated or surrenders. You win a war by KILLING and DECIMATING your enemy, idiot – not by letting him retreat to safety! Do you ever see the jihadis offering Syrian troops an “escape route” when they are surrounded somewhere – Deir Ez Zor, Kuweires air base, or any other place? Don’t you see over and over again how they always slaughter even SURRENDERED Syrian soldiers? Are the jihadis and their backers idiots, then, and YOU the only one capable of thinking up this genius stratagem???
You win your war by amassing tactical and strategic victories. These may be territory, political, resource or attrition. Thinking that victory is only measurable in terms of body counts is myoptic.
I didn’t say “victory is only measurable in terms of body counts”. But you HAVE TO RACK UP THAT BODY COUNT TOO, if you want to win. Attrition MATTERS! Do you ever see the enemy sparing Syrian soldiers, if they can help it? Why do you think that is, genius?
East Ghouta is more important than East Aleppo. East Aleppo was kind of occupied territory – conquered by rebels from the surrounding countryside. Douma in East Ghouta was the heart of the “revolution”. It was from here that the traditional color revolution scenario was planned to happen (march onto and occupy the central square). Also there are more people believed to be living in East Ghouta than in East Aleppo. So – if the peace initiative doesn’t work – one can expect the fight to be comparably heavy to Aleppo.
East Ghouta will be liberated the next year.The territory lost in 2016 was crucial for the terrorists.I dont know how many months will take,but it will be the next year.