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Written by Uriel Araujo, PhD, anthropology researcher with a focus on international and ethnic conflicts
Amid a French-Algerian row over the issue of Western Sahara, the Russian Iskander-E short-range ballistic missile system has made its first appearance in the country ahead of the 70th anniversary of its Revolution (which was commemorated on November 1), while Algiers and Moscow discuss enhancing military cooperation.
After years of speculation, it has now been confirmed that Algeria received four regiments of the Russian Iskander-E missile system, thereby becoming the first Arab country to have it as part of its arsenal. This system significantly increases Algerian missile capabilities, as it is designed to strike with precision targets such as critical infrastructure, command centers, and air defense systems themselves, while also being difficult to detect or intercept.
Algeria’s rival Morocco in turn procured the American HIMARS in 2023 and is set to become the first North African state to receive it, which marks an ongoing arms race in the region.
Macron, in a major policy shift, paid a visit to Morocco last week accompanied by a huge delegation of over 130 people, and it is reported that “big contracts” for “more than €10 billion” were signed, pertaining to energy and infrastructure. Interestingly, the same week was also a busy one for Russo-Algerian relations: among other things, Algeria was hosting a Russian Delegation for energy cooperation. Mohamed Arkab, the Algerian Minister of Energy and Mines met with Vladislav Davankov, the Vice-President of the Russian State Duma, and a Russian delegation to discuss strengthening Russo-Algerian mine and energy cooperation. They talked about enhancing Algeria’s Sonatrach and Russia’s Gazprom collaboration, besides partnership opportunities in hydrocarbon exploration and development.
The Russian Economic Mission in Algeria, together with the Algerian Chamber of Commerce and Industry also organized a business meeting in Algeria the same week to explore strategic partnerships. Moreover, on November 1, Chief of Staff of the Algerian Army, Lt. Gen. Said Chengriha met with the Russian Deputy Minister of Defense Lt. Gen. Alexander Fomin to discuss enhancing security and military cooperation between the two countries.
Even though Moscow started delivering the regiments of the aforementioned mobile missile system in 2018 (according to Russian newspaper Kommersant), the timing of the announcement is interesting as is the fact that it coincided with the Russian delegation visit and the other developments I just mentioned. It shows among other things how Algeria is ready to diversify partners. In this context, the fact that the country has recently been admitted as a member of the BRICS Development Bank is also rather interesting. Algeria is also part of the Non-Aligned Movement.
In that spirit, last week, Algerian President Tebboune also traveled to Egypt to meet with his counterpart Abdel Fattah al-Sisi, who announced that Egyptian companies are ready to work on urban development and infrastructure projects in Algeria. Tebboune also visited Oman, and is eyeing Sudan and Libya.
As I wrote recently, French-Algeria relations are deteriorating, with the whole development being described by some observers as a major shift in Paris foreign policy for West Africa. Algeria for one thing started to refuse to take back those Algerian migrants given deportation orders by the French authorities and is even placing them on planes to be sent back to France, thereby blocking the deportations. It is not the first time the country retaliates by using the issue of migration as a kind of a lever.
Moreover, the authorities in Algiers have without explanation excluded French companies from a wheat import tender even demanding that the companies taking part in it do not offer any wheat originating from France. According to Reuters, by “sidelining” its former colonizer this way, the North African country might end up “reinforcing the recent dominance of Black Sea supplies, led by Russian wheat, in Algeria’s huge import market.”
One should keep in mind the fact that Algeria is one of the world’s largest buyers of wheat, and for many years France had even been its largest supplier (today it is Russia). Those familiar with the matter say that the decision is a retaliation to Paris’ recent policy on Western Sahara, as it took place only three days after Algeria’s President Abdelmadjid Tebboune condemned Macron’s recognition of Moroccan claims. In this standoff, the politics of memory is also playing a role, with Tebboune accusing France of having committed a genocide during its colonial rule period. The European country also risks facing gas export sanctions from Algiers.
At the core of the row lies then US President Donald Trump’s 2020 decision to recognize Moroccan sovereignty claims over Western Sahara as a “quid pro quo” after Morocco normalized its relations with Israel – Biden inherited the same controversial policy.
At the time I wrote that the issue of this disputed territory was a divisive matter in the region and any increase in tensions had the potential to fuel pre-existing contradictions even between the Maghreb region and the African Union over Israel, as well as within the Maghreb region itself (also over relations with the Jewish state, among other problems). This is even truer today.
Paris’ influence in the continent is clearly declining, as it has been made clear by its failures in Niger, Mali, and Chad, and Macron’s shift is a bold move, to put it mildly. It would even seem Paris has little to gain from aggressively alienating Algeria, which is a potential key partner in terms of migration, human resources and regional stability in a key area.
Algeria is Russia’s second largest commercial partner in the African continent and also happens to be one the main importers of Russian weaponry globally. At the same time, it has been showing it is capable of pragmatically balancing its relations with both Moscow and Europe in a mutually beneficial way for both European states and Algeria itself, including energy-wise. From a Western perspective, France’s aggressive approach to the complicated Western Sahara question contributes to alienating such a key partner.
As I wrote in early 2023, Algeria has for a while aspired to become a key energy provider to Europe, while its tensions with Morocco have been haunting the region. Be it as it may, for Europe, getting a robust energy supply from North African pipelines has never really fully materialized: any such projects thus far have often gotten entangled in local political conflicts, and the Western approach to any African continent energy projects remain notoriously hypocritical.
The escalation of Algerian-Morocco tensions can also have troublesome impacts for Europe. Macron’s foreign policy turn, using the recognition of a disputed territory as a kind of quid pro quo, has in fact further aggravated the local tensions, as has Donald Trump’s decision on the same matter. From a Global South’s point of view, it is hard to describe both leaders’ decisions as anything else but Western arrogance.
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well of course france is in eu. they’re the enemh of the elite families imagine if they were friends of russia and africa. disaster for the firm