New Russia’s Iskander. INF Is Almost Dead

The Russians suffered significant casualties, they were able to outnumber the Germans (not significantly) because of their manpower and industrial resources being out of reach of the Luftwaffe in the Ural mountains or west of them Russia fielded an army proportionate to its population. In equipment their tank factories being out of reach of Lufwaffe attacks churned out simple T34’s and other reliable equipment. Had Germany not get caught in a war of attrition with the Russians, and had they started the war later by 2-3 years, whereby their industrial war production peaked in 1944, WW2 might have had a different outcome. The German military output in 1943 and 1944 was severely curtailed by allied bombing.

From what I gathered what the USSR, and the US and UK did way better then Germany was mobilize totally for war. Hitler was very weary to subject his people to the same hardship they suffered during WW1, so the German economy was never truly mobilized for total war, with significant production remaining to keep Germans in a comfortable lifestyle, even under Speer. The German army also lacked a massive trained reserve force of former trained personnel, so they found it hard to replenish losses to keep their units up to strength. Whereas as the Soviets had that massive reserve force, so even in the darkest days of 1941 they just kept up churning new armies and divisions, to the horror of the Wehrmacht.

As for waiting a few more years, more preparations would have given Germany’s enemies also more time to prepare for war. The French had built a superb defensive line in the Maginot line but needed more time to build up their mobile divisions and air force. The British needed more time to build up their army back to WW1 force levels and the Soviets to rebuild their army from the ravages of Stalin’s purges. Instinctively Hitler understood this, better then his generals did. Everyone of his gambles, Czechoslovakia, Poland, Denmark and Norway, France and the Low Countries, the Balkans and the initial Soviet invasion paid off because he caught his enemies unprepared and off foot. A better Wehrmacht would not have served Germany that much more if it meant going up against better prepared enemies. In the case of the war against the USSR Germany mobilizing its economy for total war like its enemies had in 1939, meaning more supplies, equipment and troops, I don’t know if that meant that Germany would have won the war, but I reckon the Wehrmacht would have taken more of Russia, at the very least be better prepared for the war of attrition that it now found woefully unprepared.

Hitler fought During WW1 and witnessed its aftermath, being fully aware of the gargantuan effort Germans mounted in 1918 to break the western stalemate, which was initially successful until the deployment of US troops checked their gains. Jewish industrialists in Germany refused to maintain the armament and munition production ( for free) needed for the German armies to fight the stalemate, thereby forcing Germany to surrender without being defeated on the battlefield. Hitler knew the blueprint of the WW1 and the sacrificial costs involved, therefore as he started the rearmament program in 1934-5 he knew what he needed to do. The rearmament program was 4-5 years old before Poland was invaded, not enough time for weapons program to develop and evolve. Fighting a war on two fronts was a no/no and Hitler should have been more cautious with the Russians. Initial successes were attributed to novel tactics using grouping of tanks and air power, instead of superior equipment across the board. French tanks were better than the PZK 1,2 and 3, except the PZK 3 with a 50MM gun, the Spitfire was better than Me 109…..and on …and on.

After the conquest of France and rest of the Europe I said, Germany should have waited 2 years or so, to consolidate their gains on the continent and give their armies down time, bringing in more capable and lethal equipment and running their production line at full speed. Russia could have waited 2 years and whatever measures they would have taken to reinforce themselves would have been positive, however, they could not have stopped the onslaught of a German attack. Just imagine going into Russia with PZK4 and Tigers in large numbers, equipment the Russians did not encounter, only to be replenished by Panthers, King Tigers and more Tigers.

In the air, after the fiasco of the Battle of Britain, Goering and Hitler should have placed great emphasis on aircraft procurement making sure the western front had at least 2000-3000 fighters to thwart the allied air campaign to bomb Germany and to interdict the Normandy landing.

As far as reserves, not being readily available on the Eastern front, there were at least 50 divisions scattered all over Europe and Africa, not able to participate on the Russian front. The allied divisions provided by German proxies were ok during non critical battles, however, they were unreliable against massive Russian attacks.

The German strategy of going deeper and deeper into Russia extended their front lines considerably, most of the areas needed by the Germans, Belarus, Ukraine were already bagged, after 1941 when Germans were overly extended, they should have developed a flexible defense shortening their front lines and supply lines, allowing the Russians to fill the void and extend their front lines ripe for surgical counter strikes. This would have reduced the German attrition rate significantly, Germans making contact with the Russians only when they decided to do battle, otherwise it was a game of maneuver.

>>Hitler fought During WW1 and witnessed its aftermath, being fully aware of the gargantuan effort Germans mounted in 1918 to break the western stalemate, which was initially successful until the deployment of US troops checked their gains. Jewish industrialists in Germany refused to maintain the armament and munition production ( for free) needed for the German armies to fight the stalemate, thereby forcing Germany to surrender without being defeated on the battlefield. Hitler knew the blueprint of the WW1 and the sacrificial costs involved, therefore as he started the rearmament program in 1934-5 he knew what he needed to do. The rearmament program was 4-5 years old before Poland was invaded, not enough time for weapons program to develop and evolve.<>Fighting a war on two fronts was a no/no and Hitler should have been more cautious with the Russians. Initial successes were attributed to novel tactics using grouping of tanks and air power, instead of superior equipment across the board. French tanks were better than the PZK 1,2 and 3, except the PZK 3 with a 50MM gun, the Spitfire was better than Me 109…..and on …and on.<>After the conquest of France and rest of the Europe I said, Germany should have waited 2 years or so, to consolidate their gains on the continent and give their armies down time, bringing in more capable and lethal equipment and running their production line at full speed. Russia could have waited 2 years and whatever measures they would have taken to reinforce themselves would have been positive, however, they could not have stopped the onslaught of a German attack. Just imagine going into Russia with PZK4 and Tigers in large numbers, equipment the Russians did not encounter, only to be replenished by Panthers, King Tigers and more Tigers.<>In the air, after the fiasco of the Battle of Britain, Goering and Hitler should have placed great emphasis on aircraft procurement making sure the western front had at least 2000-3000 fighters to thwart the allied air campaign to bomb Germany and to interdict the Normandy landing.<>As far as reserves, not being readily available on the Eastern front, there were at least 50 divisions scattered all over Europe and Africa, not able to participate on the Russian front. The allied divisions provided by German proxies were ok during non critical battles, however, they were unreliable against massive Russian attacks.<>The German strategy of going deeper and deeper into Russia extended their front lines considerably, most of the areas needed by the Germans, Belarus, Ukraine were already bagged, after 1941 when Germans were overly extended, they should have developed a flexible defense shortening their front lines and supply lines, allowing the Russians to fill the void and extend their front lines ripe for surgical counter strikes. This would have reduced the German attrition rate significantly, Germans making contact with the Russians only when they decided to do battle, otherwise it should have been a game of maneuver.<>Also technologicaly, the Germans had advantage in jet engines, rockets, rocket engines….etc. Just imagine if the allies could not attack Germans seriously from the air and Germany were able to produce hundreds of Me 262, V rockets…..etc, ready to be used? If the war continued and Germany was able to defend itself successfully on two fronts, a new generation of weapons would have been introduced that would have left the allies in a rather precarious situation.<<

But those weapons were only developed because of the military setbacks they suffered later in the war. There was no impetus to develop news weapons prior to Barbarossa as Hitler and the military command had judged their current gear as successful after the fall of France. That's what happens when you're successful. It actually slows down innovation. This is why only now the US is waking up to the dire straits of their conventional forces. For two decades they didn't have to worry about fighting a peer adversary, so their old Cold War legacy gear was good enough. Now they suddenly may have to fight a peer adversary and only now are they discovering that what they had is no longer up to the job.

“””think everybody was free wheeling at the time. Everybody had studied WW1 and everybody was coming up with new military doctrines, not all of them turning out to be successful. By sheer chance the Germans got it right. Doesn’t mean they had the right ideas. After all, they failed to properly plan to fight another war of attrition. That at least was something the British, who were planning on fighting WW1 all over again, got right.”””

I think most militaries after WW1 were still stuck to the concept of static lines of offense and defense prevalent during WW1. The smart ones envisioned something more fluid and mobile driven by vehicular mobility, of which the tank showed most promise. Guderian and his staff envisioned a mobile war spearheaded by mobile units (Panzer divisions) working in conjunction with air power to break through defensive lines and cutoff enemy supply and communication lines forcing the enemy to surrender instead of head on charges against established defenses resulting in large casualties. It was a smart and economical way to wage war, a war of mobility where static defenses were outmaneuvered by unpredictable movements of armored units.

This was very prevalent in France where French and British forces were expecting an encore performance of WW1, as the Germans attacked through the Benelux countries, without any regard of their southern flank south of the Maginot line, deemed impassable by tanks. Instead of a static exchange expected by the French and British forces, they found themselves cut off and rendered useless by the German pincer movement through the Ardennes.

This happened in spite of better quality of the French and British tanks that were deployed within infantry divisions as support weapons for the infantry to augment static defenses.

This tactical employment of tanks by the British and French led to their defeat, further accentuated by a string of defeats in North Afrika at the hands of Rommel, only Rommel’s headstrong and reckless advance against Alexandria lengthening German supply lines to dangerous levels and being outside of their air cover protection, allowed Montgomery to keep his supply lines short, being able to concentrate an overwhelming advantage over Rommel for the battles of Al Alemein. Rommel displayed the same level of impetuous recklessness as the German High command (in certain cases) in facing reality and being able to weigh the pros and cons of the battlefield conditions and condition of their equipment and troops.

To be continued.

“””think everybody was free wheeling at the time. Everybody had studied WW1 and everybody was coming up with new military doctrines, not all of them turning out to be successful. By sheer chance the Germans got it right. Doesn’t mean they had the right ideas. After all, they failed to properly plan to fight another war of attrition. That at least was something the British, who were planning on fighting WW1 all over again, got right.”””

>>I think most militaries after WW1 were still stuck to the concept of static lines of offense and defense prevalent during WW1. The smart ones envisioned something more fluid and mobile driven by vehicular mobility, of which the tank showed most promise.

Guderian and his staff envisioned a mobile war spearheaded by mobile units (Panzer divisions) working in conjunction with air power to break through defensive lines and cutoff enemy supply and communication lines forcing the enemy to surrender instead of head on charges against established defenses resultingin large casualties.<>It was a smart and economical way to wage war, a war of mobility where static defenses were outmaneuvered by unpredictable movements of armored units.<>This was very prevalent in France where French and British forces were expecting an encore performance of WW1, as the Germans attacked through the Benelux countries, without any regard of their southern flank south of the Maginot line, deemed impassable by tanks. Instead of a static exchange expected by the French and British forces, they found themselves cut off and rendered useless by the German pincer movement through the Ardennes.<>This happened in spite of better quality of the French and British tanks that were deployed within infantry divisions as support weapons for the infantry to augment static defenses.<>This tactical employment of tanks by the British and French led to their defeat, further accentuated by a string of defeats in North Afrika at the hands of Rommel, only Rommel’s headstrong and reckless advance against Alexandria lengthening German supply lines to dangerous levels and being outside of their air cover protection, allowed Montgomery to keep his supply lines short, being able to concentrate an overwhelming advantage over Rommel for the battles of Al Alemein.

Rommel displayed the same level of impetuous recklessness as the German High command (in certain cases) in facing reality and being able to weigh the pros and cons of the battlefield conditions and condition of their equipment and troops.<>To be continued.<<

You’re welcome.

“””The Russians had their own identical doctrine, created by Marshall Tuthayevski. Who unfortunately met with an unfortunate case fatal purging by Stalin. Even the Italians had a similar doctrine. But for some strange reason when they invaded Egypt in 1940 its own creator failed to apply it.”””

A theory sounds good until it is actually implemented, the German high command was not fully on board for an attack through through the Ardennes, however Guderian’s insistence convinced Hitler to give it a try.

“”””All the diehard tank believers before the war believed in tank heavy forces that could win battles by themselves, leading to armored divisions that were tank heavy and light on infantry. Hobart in the UK, but Guderian in Germany just as well. At least the Germans were the first to learn how wrong this was in the invasion of Poland, after which they began to reduce the number of tanks per panzer division. And even further after the fall of France. By the end of WW2 German panzer divisions had twice as many infantry battalions as tank battalions. Which was the opposite of how they started. Because they realized it was all about combined arms warfare, not just tanks.”””

Tanks ideally served as the role of cavalry in modern warfare, they were designed for speed, shock and flanking attacks, while the infantry engaged in linear positions supported by archers and other light troops. Prepping the break through hole for tanks to exploit, it took combined arms, Stuka dive bombers, artilery, tank breakthroughs followed by mechanized infantry. Since German tanks at the beginning of the war were lightly armed, especially in Russia, they needed to deal with antitank nests and stubborn entrenched infantry, along with the fact that tank replenishments were not fully replacing losses, and to possibly reduce the logistical burden for fuel and ammo, the panzer divisions had fewer tanks and more infantry.

“””But Rommel is easily the most deified German commander of that war. A lot of bullshit has been written about him because of the myths that have sprung up him.”””

Rommel was a skilled commander ( a more reckless Guderian) that did well against an extended enemy and used unorthodox approaches in dealing with numerically superior enemies, however, his forces were never strong enough and efforts to resupply him became half hearted since Hitler’s fixation with the Eastern front. Italians did ok, but not according to Rommel’s demands. In the end what could have been a promising campaign to interdict the Suez canal by allocating sufficient forces and supplies, became a side show.

“””Key to the German success was their blitzkrieg doctrine, which was officially called schwerpunkt, overwhelming concentration of forces on a narrow front in order to break through, then exploit the breakthrough. But they could only use that tactic effectively against an enemy that was markedly inferior, or to whom they enjoyed numerically superiority. The time window to exploit those advantages was in 1941, not 1943. After that the Russian army kept getting bigger and better armed. Germany’s numerical advantage would cease.”””

1941 was not the proper time for attacking Russia, the Germans knew their tanks were inferior to the British and French tanks, going into Russia with mostly PZK2 and PZK3 and a handful of PZK4 was an arrogant mistake. As I said, they could have waited a couple of years, after all Germany had a peace treaty with Russia, and consolidated the conquered European industrial infrastructure for war production producing aircraft and more PZK4 along with some heavier tanks, pre Tiger prototypes that were available, and basically gearing up for a major war, not waging a major war on a shoestring approach, gearing up the industrial production for peak output in 1944. Germany could have continued using submarines against American and English shipping, curtailing the flow of supplies from US to England, and not starting the Battle of Britain until Luftwaffe gained significant advantage against RAF, after all England was not ready for war, and being interdicted in Atlantic could not muster the economic effort and output of continental Europe conquered by the Germans. The Battle of Britain was a battle where the Germans tried to fight a major war with an inadequate Luftwaffe, it is a battle they could have waited until the Luftwaffe had the numerical advantage to overwhelm British air defenses.

“””Key to the German success was their blitzkrieg doctrine, which was officially called schwerpunkt, overwhelming concentration of forces on a narrow front in order to break through, then exploit the breakthrough. But they could only use that tactic effectively against an enemy that was markedly inferior, or to whom they enjoyed numerically superiority. The time window to exploit those advantages was in 1941, not 1943.”””

Sorry for the spotty responses, I do not have the time to respond in a continuous manner, yes, blitzkrieg worked well against weaker opponents, however I do not consider France a weak opponent, Russia was not weak either, it’s terrain was ideal for blitzkrieg. Germans had the advantage against Russia in 1941, had they been prepared for the winter, they could have minimized their casualties, in 1942 the campaign started well and should have been a success if Stalingrad had not become a fixation, the Germans could have bypassed or isolated it, and cut off the oil flow on Volga, and their pincer movement against Caucasus oil fields did not need to involve large forces.

“””Except the Panther, Tiger and King Tiger were never designed, developed or even dreamed up prior to Barbarossa. In fact the Germans thought their tanks were excellent after the battle of France. It was only when they started to encounter the T-34 and KV-1 (in small numbers) that they realized their tanks were lacking. So your two year delay would see greater numbers of Pz-III’s and IV’s, but no Panthers, no Tigers and certainly no King Tigers. Which in way might not have been so bad, as those tanks were very unreliable, and certainly not suited for the wear and tear of driving all the way to Moscow and beyond. On the other hand giving the Soviets 2 more years of prep time would see their outdated tank fleet of BT tanks replaced by T-34’s and KV-1’s.”””

Yes I realize that Tigers and Panthers were not produced prior to Barbarossa, German assessment of captured French and British tanks indicated PZK2 and 3 were not that superior in their existing condition, the Germans were considering a heavier tank than PZK 4 prior to the war, and their production of PZK 4 during 1941 was a mere 480 units. Two years wait would have provided 994 units in 1942, and 2983 units in 1943, plus the heavier version pre Tiger tank they already were working on. We are talking about almost 4000 PZK4 that could be easily upgraded with heavier armor and more powerful gun, as situations required. Almost all PZK 2 and 3 could have been relegated to second echelon duties or armed the German allies in Russia.

As far as Russian T34 and Kv-1, they were in early stages of production and suffered a lot of teething problems, from some reliable sources during 1941, a lot of these tanks broke down and were ineffective in stopping the German onslaught. I do not know if an extra two years without fighting conditions, would have helped to improve these machines from a qualitative standpoint. As far as German Tigers and Panthers, they had their teething issues, which were resolved to a acceptable degree, their numbers becoming significant in 1944, as germans were loosing the war and the Romanian oil fields.

>>Sorry for the spotty responses, I do not have the time to respond in a continuous manner,<>yes, blitzkrieg worked well against weaker opponents, however I do not consider France a weak opponent, Russia was not weak either, it’s terrain was ideal for blitzkrieg.<>Germans had the advantage against Russia in 1941, had they been prepared for the winter, they could have minimized their casualties, in 1942 the campaign started well and should have been a success if Stalingrad had not become a fixation, the Germans could have bypassed or isolated it, and cut off the oil flow on Volga, and their pincer movement against Caucasus oil fields did not need to involve large forces.<>Yes I realize that Tigers and Panthers were not produced prior to Barbarossa, German assessment of captured French and British tanks indicated PZK2 and 3 were not that superior in their existing condition, the Germans were considering a heavier tank than PZK 4 prior to the war, and their production of PZK 4 during 1941 was a mere 480 units. Two years wait would have provided 994 units in 1942, and 2983 units in 1943, plus the heavier version pre Tiger tank they already were working on. We are talking about almost 4000 PZK4 that could be easily upgraded with heavier armor and more powerful gun, as situations required.<>Almost all PZK 2 and 3 could have been relegated to second echelon duties or armed the German allies in Russia.<>As far as Russian T34 and Kv-1, they were in early stages of production and suffered a lot of teething problems, from some reliable sources during 1941, a lot of these tanks broke down and were ineffective in stopping the German onslaught. I do not know if an extra two years without fighting conditions, would have helped to improve these machines from a qualitative standpoint.<>As far as German Tigers and Panthers, they had their teething issues, which were resolved to a acceptable degree, their numbers becoming significant in 1944, as germans were loosing the war and the Romanian oil fields.

It can be argued that they were the WORST thing that the Germans needed. As it took more resources to build a Panther and Tiger tank then to build a PzIV. They also consumed more resources in the field to keep them going, consumed more fuel and were still prone to break down. If Germany for the same amount of resources could field more PzIV’s with its capable gun, then quantity has a quality of its own right.

Panthers and Tigers in particular gained mythical status in the West. I think it was because when inexperienced US and UK tankers landed in Normandy in 1944, the worst possible tank terrain, and then started to encounter German armor, crewed by experienced German tankers in perfect ambush terrain, a nasty shock happened that traumatized them and gained mythical status. The UK has since become obsessed with building the best armored tanks in the world, the Chieftain, Challenger 1 and 2 basically the reincarnation of the Tiger tank. Slow, heavily armored, big gun, yeah, its a Tiger all the way. And the Americans have also wanted something like the Panther. Which they finally got with the Abrams. Named after the general who was a battalion commander in the US 4th armored division under Patton. Tiger psychosis hit the Western allies deeply and influenced their tank designs ever since.

Ironically the Germans viewed it differently. They learned that despite having had the best armored and gunned tanks they did not win the war for them. Because 3:1 or 4:1 kill odds mean little when you’re outnumbered 10:1. Worse if half of your tanks are out of order on any given day. So they went the other way after WW2 and basically designed with the Leopard 1 a modern T-34/Sherman. Even the Leopard 2 was less armored then its British and American counterparts. Because reliability and numbers matter as quantity was a quality of its own.

“””Actually the Russian terrain was atrocious for Blitzkrieg, it depended on good road systems so the panzers could move about. Russia’s terrain was terrible and the German tanks were ill suited to it, with their narrow tracks. That’s why the German advance ground to a halt when the autumn rains came. France however was perfect for blitzkrieg. A well developed road system, terrain that the Germans knew very well, if only it was on every commercially available map.”””

Open terrain is ideal for blitzkrieg, Germans should have considered that rain would make the terrain a mud hole, and subsequently scheduled their operations accordingly. Maybe start the invasion earlier, although from my standpoint it was idiotic for Germans to finish off the Battle of Britain to invade the Balkans and Crete prior to Barbarossa and overwork the tanks and their equipment. Yes, the Frence had a more advance network of roads, however, movements on the roads can be anticipated and antitank defenses established, obvious avenues of approach can be defended easily. I wonder how muddy the Ardennes would have been in September or October.

“””Another thing why blitzkrieg failed in Russia was that due to the huge distances the panzers would advance too quickly for the German infantry to catch up, only to let hundreds of thousands of Soviet troops escape from the panzer’s encirclements. With most of them running into the forests becoming the core of the partisans, and a major headache to the Germans.”””

The pockets were large and porous allowing Russians to extricate themselves, as far as the Partisan movement, had the Germans followed a more conventional approach to deal with Ukrainians and Belorussians, instead of the SS treatment, their occupied teritories would have been more stable and cooperative.

“””The Germans botched up both Barbarossa and the Fall Gelb campaigns. For Barbarossa the German high command envisioned a repeat of the French campaign. Envelop the enemy army, destroy it in a cauldron battle, then take his capital and watch him crumble”””

That is not much different than what Napoleon wanted to do, after fighting an inconclusive battle at Borodino that resulted in heavy casualties on both sides, he took Moscow only to find the Russians using scorch earth approach to deny him any support and his supply lines were extremely long and easily harassed. Even if the Germans took Moscow by November the Russians would have pulled back and not crumbled, after all everything was migrating towards Urals and east of it, the Germans were not ready for wintering in Russia, and their supply lines would have been stretched to a severe limit. A more cautious approach was to stop 2-300 kms from Moscow and develop defensive positions against possible counterattacks, dig in and spend the winter in a more protective environment. Pushing the German troops more and more towards Moscow ignoring weather conditions, coupled with physical and psychological exhaustion, led to good opportunities for Russians to counterattack the stretched German positions and inflict severe casualties.

“””Except that France showed the PzIII to be perfectly fine, it just needed a bigger 50mm gun. They would not have been relegated to the 2nd echelon. And the PzII was already on the way out, slated to be replaced by the PzIII anyway.”””

50MM gun was insufficient for the Russian campaign, actually all German tanks participating in Barbarossa were outgunned by T34 and KV-1, it is amazing the Germans moved so speedily against the Russians in view, estimates of 2000 T34’s and Kv1’s have been floated around, these 2000 tanks should have massacred the German tanks, if they operated properly and did not break down. PZK 3 could have been a support tank engaging support and transport vehicles. In France Germany won because of a clever maneuver, without crushing the British and French armour in decisive armored battles. In Russia they had to fight pitched armored battles, their tank weaknesses and numbers led to higher casualties.

“”””Yes, but give the Soviets two more years and chances are those teething problems would have been fixed. WHy shouldn’t they? Even the USSR had quality control and feedback from troops in the field. A tank that constantly breaks down in the field will get noticed even by Soviet bureaucracy. And the biggest reasons those tanks were not that effective in 1941 was because there were not enough of them.”””

I do not know what the Russians would have done, the Soviet mindset was to produce the T34’s and have them ready for the immediate battle at hand, and not think much beyond that. T34 casualties during the war were quite severe.

“””It can be argued that they were the WORST thing that the Germans needed. As it took more resources to build a Panther and Tiger tank then to build a PzIV. They also consumed more resources in the field to keep them going, consumed more fuel and were still prone to break down. If Germany for the same amount of resources could field more PzIV’s with its capable gun, then quantity has a quality of its own right.”””

I don’t think so, newer weapons require additional resources because of improved capabilities. I think Tiger was a fine tank, as it was not properly utilized subsequent snafus resulted. Instead of deploying them piece meal, they should have built a Panzer army equipped with 3-400 Tigers and a few hundred PZK4 ready towards the end of 1943, avoiding the Kursk drama, or launching the Kursk offensive in early May, instead of waiting for some Tigers and Panthers to be ready. Yea, I like a tank that can take out half a dozen enemy tanks before they get in position to make a kill or outflank you for a side shot, a phalanx of 200 tigers supported by lighter PZK 4 would take out over 1000 enemy tanks, that is a quality of its own, not much different than the Macedonian phalanx.

The problems with the Tigers and Panthers in 1944 was that they lacked air cover being prone to carpet bombing on the western front, and loss of fuel sources from Roumania and the bombing of synthetic oil and refining capacity that that constricted mobility and proper allocation of fuel to the Luftwaffe.

I think you should watch TIK’s video on the most important reason why Germany lost the war.

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=kVo5I0xNRhg

It’s all about oil. In short, around 1940 90% of the world’s oil came from the US and Venezuela. Since Britain blockaded Germany, that left them only with synthetic oil and Romanian oil. But that only made up for half what the Axis powers needed. If Germany did not get more oil supplies by the end of 1941 it would no longer be able to launch any major offensives. So even if Germany had waited two more years to build up its panzers it could no longer operate them as it had no more fuel for them left. The generals in charge of logistics even recommend that the Wehrmacht should de-motorize, not increase its motorization. The issue was not enough tanks, they actually increased their tank numbers in 1942 and 1943, despite the war, it’s oil. That’s why they invaded Russia in 1941. It was the only time period left to them to still launch a major invasion in order to get Russian oil. When that failed lack of oil forced the Wehrmacht to scale down offensive operation to just one army group in 1942, and just two armies in 1943.

Germany just did not have the oil supplies and oil stocks to wait two more years for more tanks and trucks. How good any tanks were going to get is irrelevant. As Bill Clinton said, it’s about the economy, stupid! Hitler understood this better then his generals. Unfortunately his generals wrote the post war narrative so we now think it was their sound arguments that got overruled. No, their arguments were wrong to begin with. History is not always written by the winners, sometimes it gets written by the losers too.

“””It’s all about oil. In short, around 1940 90% of the world’s oil came from the US and Venezuela. Since Britain blockaded Germany, that left them only with synthetic oil and Romanian oil”””

Germany was fully familiar with the British blockade of WW1, the Germans adopting mechanized warfare concepts realized they needed fuel to power the mobility of such an army, and they knew domestic crude production was almost nonexistent, therefore they embarked on a construction spree to build plants that produced synthetic oil to maintain self sufficiency in case of another blockade. Synthetic oil hovered close to almost 6 million tons through 1943, in the spring of 1944 it got close 6.4 million tons. Romanian exports of 15,000,000 barrels a year constituted almost 2.15 million tons, and local German production + Austrian+ Polish extraction amounted to close to 2 million tons of oil. All in all, Germany could count on 10 million tons of crude and synthetic oil. It is possible the synthetic fuel production could have been higher had not Speer limited the steel allocation for such plants.

“””But that only made up for half what the Axis powers needed.”””

I am not so sure about that assessment, Germany used about 600,000 vehicles and several thousand tanks for Barbarossa, the initial fuel requirements were heavy, if you allocate 2 tons of fuel for each vehicle, that adds up to about 1.3 million tons of fuel. Add another 3-500,000 tons for the Luftwaffe and you get close to 2 million tons of fuel. These are my rough estimates, the narrative that Germany had only 2 months supply of fuel to wrap up the Barbarossa is not very credible. With a production output close to 10 million tons a year, 850,000 tons could be allocated on a monthly basis.

“””needed. If Germany did not get more oil supplies by the end of 1941 it would no longer be able to launch any major offensives”””

That is somebody’s opinion.

“””So even if Germany had waited two more years to build up its panzers it could no longer operate them as it had no more fuel for them left.”””

If Germany would have waited 2 years, they would have increased their oil stockpile, helped by Russian export of 650,000 tons of crude a year a provision of the non aggression treaty signed with USSR, and 2.15 million tons of Romanian oil.

The two months supply of fuel is not very credible, considering the Wehrmacht did not stop in its tracks in September, it retained mobility and got close to a few kms from Moscow. The very strategic approach of Barbarossa did not denote a sense of urgency to go for the Soviet fuel, even in 1942 the Wehrmacht retained mobility, although supply lines were significantly stretched. Even as they wanted to take Caucus oil fields, the force allocation was altered, weakening Army B while Army A got bogged down around Stalingrad. Germans did not need Stalingrad, they could cut down the barge flow of oil and troops using artilery south of the city along with repeated Luftwaffe attacks. If oil was such a fixation for the Germans, the 1941 invasion could have been spearheaded from Moldova and southern Roumania and they would have been in proximity of Volga in a few months and north of Caucus. Their front line In central and southern Ukraine would have delivered the decisive blow, while the frontline of northern fixation with Moscow and Leningrad would have been obliquely deployed hundreds of miles away from Moscow and Leningrad after capturing Belarus.

My assessment of why Germany lost the war: 1. Luftwaffe did not have a strategic vision and was considered air artilery for the ground forces. 2. They never developed a good two engine bomber that had the range and payload to be employed in strategic bombing. Not being to attack the Soviet oil fields and the military industrial complex proved to be a detriment of significant value. 3. Luftwaffe never built enough fighters to suppress allied air raids on Central Europe from 1943 until the end of the war. As a result, German military industrial complex including the synthetic fuel plants were bombed at will, reducing the fuel output significantly. As I stated earlier, in spring of 1944 the synthetic oil production per day was 124,000 barrels, as of August and September as a result of the incessant bombings that production was down almost 90%, therefore the Ardennes offensive was carried out on fumes. Aircraft, SPG, tanks that were produced in significant numbers in 1944 could not be operational because of lack of fuel.

>>Germany was fully familiar with the British blockade of WW1, the Germans adopting mechanized warfare concepts realized they needed fuel to power the mobility of such an army, and they knew domestic crude production was almost nonexistent, therefore they embarked on a construction spree to build plants that produced synthetic oil to maintain self sufficiency in case of another blockade. Synthetic oil hovered close to almost 6 million tons through 1943, in the spring of 1944 it got close 6.4 million tons. Romanian exports of 15,000,000 barrels a year constituted almost 2.15 million tons, and local German production + Austrian+ Polish extraction amounted to close to 2 million tons of oil. All in all, Germany could count on 10 million tons of crude and synthetic oil. It is possible the synthetic fuel production could have been higher had not Speer limited the steel allocation for such plants.<>I am not so sure about that assessment, Germany used about 600,000 vehicles and several thousand tanks for Barbarossa, the initial fuel requirements were heavy, if you allocate 2 tons of fuel for each vehicle, that adds up to about 1.3 million tons of fuel. Add another 3-500,000 tons for the Luftwaffe and you get close to 2 million tons of fuel. These are my rough estimates, the narrative that Germany had only 2 months supply of fuel to wrap up the Barbarossa is not very credible. With a production output close to 10 million tons a year, 850,000 tons could be allocated on a monthly basis.<>That is somebody’s opinion.<>If Germany would have waited 2 years, they would have increased their oil stockpile, helped by Russian export of 650,000 tons of crude a year a provision of the non aggression treaty signed with USSR, and 2.15 million tons of Romanian oil.<>The two months supply of fuel is not very credible, considering the Wehrmacht did not stop in its tracks in September, it retained mobility and got close to a few kms from Moscow.>>

Obviously the estimate was wrong. But only by a month or two. The advance did came to a stop eventually. And after that there was only enough fuel for Army Group Center to continue to Moscow. Notice that the other two Army Groups came to a full stop altogether.

>>The very strategic approach of Barbarossa did not denote a sense of urgency to go for the Soviet fuel, even in 1942 the Wehrmacht retained mobility, although supply lines were significantly stretched.<>Even as they wanted to take Caucus oil fields, the force allocation was altered, weakening Army B while Army A got bogged down around Stalingrad.<>Germans did not need Stalingrad, they could cut down the barge flow of oil and troops using artilery south of the city along with repeated Luftwaffe attacks. If oil was such a fixation for the Germans, the 1941 invasion could have been spearheaded from Moldova and southern Roumania and they would have been in proximity of Volga in a few months and north of Caucus.

Their front line In central and southern Ukraine would have delivered the decisive blow, while the frontline of northern fixation with Moscow and Leningrad would have been obliquely deployed hundreds of miles away from Moscow and Leningrad after capturing Belarus.<>My assessment of why Germany lost the war: 1. Luftwaffe did not have a strategic vision and was considered air artilery for the ground forces.<>2. They never developed a good two engine bomber that had the range and payload to be employed in strategic bombing. Not being to attack the Soviet oil fields and the military industrial complex proved to be a detriment of significant value.<>3. Luftwaffe never built enough fighters to suppress allied air raids on Central Europe from 1943 until the end of the war. As a result, German military industrial complex including the synthetic fuel plants were bombed at will, reducing the fuel output significantly.<>As I stated earlier, in spring of 1944 the synthetic oil production per day was 124,000 barrels, as of August and September as a result of the incessant bombings that production was down almost 90%, therefore the Ardennes offensive was carried out on fumes. Aircraft, SPG, tanks that were produced in significant numbers in 1944 could not be operational because of lack of fuel.<<

See? Oil was the main factor. Also note that by the spring of 1944 the Red Army was within striking distance of the Romanian oilfields as it had taken back the Ukraine. Which I reckon was an even bigger disaster in itself .

The Houthis are disrupting inept coalition tactics with the use of available weapons available. Light infantry equipped with ATGMs are wreaking havoc on coalition armour because of poor tactics and lack of APU on their armor. T90 fared a lot better in Syria against ISIS and FSA armed with TOW and a variety of other ATGMs, because of better protection using soft kill and reactive armour, and sound tactics of deploying armour.

That is all true and the fact that Western trained infantry all prefer to ride around in armoured vehicles whilst travelling through rugged country .

The correct tactics would be to scour the countryside on foot to disrupt ATGM sniper teams etc BUT that would go against Western Health and Safety Policy :)

I know, physical exertion on part of the western infantries is limited, since a lifestyle of leisure and do nothing places them in the same situation Romans found themselves in when fighting invading barbarians, where they did go into battle without helmets and armour ……because they were too heavy and burdensome.