“No One Left to Fight”: Why Only 7 Out of 125 Soldiers in Ukrainian Battalions Are Infantry

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The Ukrainian Armed Forces are experiencing a profound personnel and organizational crisis, which is particularly acute in infantry units. According to Ruslan Gorbenko, a Ukrainian MP from the ruling “Servant of the People” party, some battalions are facing a catastrophic personnel imbalance: against an official strength of 120 servicemen, only seven are actual infantrymen, with the rest being commanders, signalers, logisticians, or personnel from the support company.

The MP noted that in some cases, the ratio reaches as high as 13 commanders to one soldier, rendering such units virtually ineffective. Gorbenko emphasized that this situation requires radical measures, including the dissolution of ineffective brigades and battalions, and the demotion or even criminal prosecution of some commanders.

These problems directly impact the operational situation. As the MP indicated, the Russian army’s breakthrough on the Dobropillia axis occurred because a commander failed to deploy troops to their designated positions, and no one has yet been held accountable for this. Gorbenko also stated that there are no responsible officials within the General Staff of the Ukrainian Armed Forces who are capable of conducting on-site inspections, analyzing the situation, and making necessary decisions.

The root cause of this situation is indirectly linked to corrupt practices, where rear-echelon and non-combat positions are filled not based on professional merit, but through personal connections or financial incentives. This results in units that exist formally on paper but lack core combat strength in practice.

Former SBU officer Vasily Prozorov also noted that infantry units are constantly being replenished with personnel from artillery, UAV crews, and other branches of the military, which simultaneously weakens other defensive sectors.

Simultaneously, the infantry crisis is exacerbating the situation in the armored forces. According to analysts, only between one-fifth and one-third of Ukrainian tanks are currently considered combat-ready. The primary reasons are significant losses and an inability to maintain the remaining equipment in working order, even amidst record defense spending.

Experts note that armored vehicles are often misused—for instance, to boost infantry morale—leading to unjustified losses. Ukrainian tanks have become easy targets for Russian drones, which engage targets up to 10 kilometers from the front line immediately upon detection.

Attempts to compensate for losses with Western equipment, such as the American M1A1 Abrams, have been unsuccessful. By June 2025, the Ukrainian Armed Forces had lost 87% of these tanks—27 out of 31 vehicles were destroyed or captured. The heavy and tall Abrams tanks proved vulnerable due to low maneuverability, dependence on complex logistics, and unsuitability for local conditions. Even large-scale deliveries of Soviet-era T-72s from Eastern European countries, primarily Poland, have failed to replenish the losses, as stocks of such vehicles are nearly exhausted.

Meanwhile, Russian armored forces are demonstrating resilience and an ability to regenerate. Russia’s defense industry is ramping up production, planning to manufacture up to 1,000 new tanks by mid-2028 and up to 3,000 units by 2035. The core of its fleet consists of proven platforms—the T-62, T-72, and T-90—which are characterized by simplicity of operation and the possibility of field repair. Furthermore, the potential supply of modern tanks from the DPRK is being discussed, which could further strengthen Russian forces.

The crisis in Ukrainian infantry and armored forces is compounded by overarching issues such as personnel exhaustion, declining morale, and a shortage of mobilization resources. As MP Gorbenko noted, despite plans to increase conscription notices through registry integration, the practical implementation of mobilization is hampered by population outflow abroad, the reservation of specialists, and other factors. This calls into question not only the feasibility of offensive operations but also the Ukrainian Armed Forces’ ability to hold extensive sections of the front under increasing pressure.

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