Russian “Matryoshka”: The Mother Drone Strategy That Turns Cheap FPVs into Long-Range Weapons

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Russia is moving from ad hoc improvisations to a coherent doctrine for long-range FPV strikes, and Russian outlets have already given it a telling name: “Matryoshka.” The first confirmed use of this tactic was recorded on the Zaporizhzhia axis.

The metaphor fits. A larger reconnaissance UAV—most often from the Orlan family—carries smaller kamikaze FPVs nested beneath its wings, then either relays their control link from altitude or hands them off to civilian cellular networks once they reach the rear. The effect is to turn cheap FPVs into deep-strike weapons at a fraction of the cost of cruise missiles. Ukrainian units have reported and photographed Orlan airframes carrying two FPVs under the wings, the clearest signal yet that “mother drone” configurations have left the lab and entered the battlefield.

Russia has begun launching FPV drones en masse from larger UAVs, enabling its armed forces to strike targets dozens of kilometers away

The mechanics are straightforward and troubling. In one mode, the Orlan climbs and functions as a mast in the sky: the FPV detaches, dives on target, and receives a clean video and control relay from above, sidestepping the line-of-sight limits that usually cap ground-controlled FPVs at a few kilometers. In another, the carrier delivers FPVs into areas with strong mobile network coverage; operators then switch to SIM-based control over LTE and prosecute targets far beyond the traditional FPV envelope. Reports also describe “Molniya” drones acting as low-cost delivery vehicles to push FPVs deeper before the cellular handoff. This multi-path approach complicates electronic warfare and makes the last mile of defense far less predictable.

There is another layer. Russian operators have begun to combine drone types in sequential strikes: launching incendiary drones first to burn through or damage anti-drone netting around vehicles and fortified positions, and then following up with FPVs to deliver precision kills on equipment and hardened targets. This playbook demonstrates an evolving sophistication—using expendable drones not just to strike but to deliberately degrade defenses and clear the way for follow-on waves.

Strategically, “Matryoshka” matters because it builds on what Russia already fields in large numbers. Orlan-class airframes are plentiful, relatively inexpensive by UAV standards, and familiar to operators. Repurposing them as carriers and airborne relays immediately expands the target set: ammunition depots, short-range air-defense radars, bridging sites, brigade command posts, fuel farms—assets typically parked 20–50+ kilometers behind the line. The rear stops being a sanctuary once an attacker can ride civilian LTE/5G networks and spend $1–5K FPVs to force million-dollar defenses to reveal themselves, relocate, and resupply. The economics are skewed, and the architecture is portable: rugged airframes, off-the-shelf cameras and radios, and software that exploits commercial towers wherever coverage is strong. In practice, that converts rear areas into contested airspace and applies sustained pressure on logistics at relatively low cost.

The operational consequences are already visible. Instead of relying on dramatic armored thrusts, “Matryoshka” supports a constant interdiction rhythm: a steady erosion of logistics and command nodes that slows tempo, disperses stockpiles, and drives up the cost of simply holding ground. Layered short-range air defense and counter-UAS teams must now treat the backline like a skirmish zone, not a safe parking lot. Every bridge, fuel lot, and radar becomes a candidate for low-cost harassment. Over time, the cumulative effect is to force the defender into a defensive crouch—more vehicles on the move, more decoys, more emissions control, and more money spent to counter what are, at root, expendable drones.

Looking ahead, several trends are likely over the next 6–18 months. Carriers will move beyond two FPVs to three or more, coordinating staggered releases to saturate defenses. Communication resilience will improve: today’s LTE handoffs are a bridge to multi-path links that can shift among cellular, line-of-sight, and satellite relays as jamming pressure changes, automatically riding whichever signal survives. Sequential use of mixed drone types—incendiary, relay, and FPV—will expand as operators refine strike packages. And the tactic will bleed into campaign design: cheap, persistent interdiction allows Russia to pressure rear nodes daily, turning the war into a constant, creeping strike campaign that rarely produces dramatic headlines but steadily shifts the balance. Because the concept is modular—airframe plus pods plus software—it is portable to other theaters with dense LTE/5G coverage. There is little reason to assume “Matryoshka” will remain unique to this conflict.

Countermeasures exist, but none are cheap or simple. The center of gravity is the carrier: hunting Orlan-class motherships with dedicated counter-UAS sections and interceptor drones will yield the most leverage per engagement. Rear-area hardening must become routine: mobile SHORAD rings around high-value nodes, rapid-response C-UAS teams on call, disciplined emissions management, and deliberate deception to waste the attacker’s sorties. Where lawful and feasible, cell-denial bubbles around critical sites could blunt LTE-assisted last-mile control, but that requires balancing against civilian needs and friendly command-and-control. Even with such countermeasures in place, the cost dynamics still benefit the attacker: inexpensive drones can be launched repeatedly, and a determined opponent will eventually find a gap in the defenses.

The bottom line is that “Matryoshka” turns Russia’s most ubiquitous reconnaissance drone into a force-multiplier for cheap precision. Airborne relays, cellular handoffs, and now sequenced mixed-drone tactics allow FPVs to leap the front and hunt what used to be safe. If this doctrine scales as expected, the next phase of the conflict will look less like set-piece battles and more like relentless, distributed pressure that forces defenders to spend heavily just to stand still. And because the blueprint relies on off-the-shelf parts and civilian networks, it is unlikely to remain confined to Ukraine. It will spread.

And for now, it seems that Russia is winning the world’s first drone war…

MORE ON THE TOPIC:

• Russian Orlan-30 Can Now Carry FPV Drones
• In Video: Ukrainian FPV Drone Won Battle Against Russian Orlan-10 UAV
• Russian Army Expands Use Of New Giatsint-K Heavy Wheeled Howitzer (Video)

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