Russia’s Autumn Offensive: Preparation, Resources, and Operational Logic

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Russian Chief of the General Staff Valery Gerasimov

Moscow intends to push ahead with a decisive phase of its “special military operation.” To do so, it is changing how it fights: small assault groups, carefully rationed use of heavy armor, stronger artillery employment, and streamlined recruitment of manpower reserves are forming the basis for the next push along multiple axes.

What’s Behind the General Staff’s Messaging?

On August 30, Russian Chief of the General Staff Valery Gerasimov announced “continuous offensive operations along the entire front line,” claiming the capture of “3,500 square kilometers and 149 settlements” since spring. He also stated that Moscow controls 99.7% of the Luhansk region, 79% of the Donetsk region, 74% of the Zaporizhzhia region, and 76% of the Kherson region. These figures appear inflated—independent observers confirm only limited gains—but the rhetoric itself signals an intention to continue the campaign as a long, attritional offensive.

Russian Chief of the General Staff Valery Gerasimov

By late summer, the nature of combat had clearly shifted from rare, large armored thrusts to constant pressure by small units. On key sectors, Russian formations follow a now-familiar sequence: drones conduct reconnaissance and refine targets, a short artillery strike follows, and then a small infantry group pushes forward, trying to secure even a few positions. If the breach fails, the attack is repeated on an adjacent sector.

Use of light vehicles—motorcycles, ATVs, and buggies—is also growing. These allow assault groups to move quickly between cover, reducing vulnerability to drones and artillery.

This pattern of repeated small-unit assaults does not produce major breakthroughs, but it steadily wears down defenses and forces Ukraine to keep reserves on constant alert.

The tempo of attacks remains steady, and territorial gains are incremental. Independent sources confirm the capture of several settlements in Dnipropetrovsk Oblast, while Moscow’s official reports claim “hundreds of square kilometers per month.” Even if the real figure is smaller, these repeated advances are laying the groundwork for expanding the ground campaign—not with massed armored columns, but through sustained pressure along multiple directions.

Tactical Shift: From BTGs to “Expendable” Assault Elements

The key structural change is a move away from battalion tactical groups (BTGs). They have been replaced by small assault formations—company tactical groups or assault detachments. Their mission is reconnaissance-in-force and “softening” the defense: forcing the opponent to expend ammunition, exposing firing points, and then repeating the cycle nearby.

The emphasis on light mobility is central to this model. With motorcycles, ATVs, and buggies now deployed in significant numbers, Russian units can “hop” rapidly between cover and adapt to an environment saturated with FPV drones. On the ground, this translates into a series of short rushes with minimal protection and portable anti-drone systems.

Russian fighters are entering the outskirts of Druzhelyubovka on the Rubtsovsk direction

Such a tactical adjustment requires both agility and reliable logistical support—factors that connect directly to Russia’s evolving resource base.

Resource Base

In heavy armor, Russia is not producing in overwhelming numbers, but output is steadily rising. Independent analysts estimate that by 2025, annual production of T-90M tanks reached roughly 280–300 units, up from 60–70 in 2022 and 140–180 in 2023. Since the start of the war, at least 540–630 T-90Ms have been produced, with around 130 confirmed destroyed. Roughly 400–500 remain operational. This provides Moscow with a significant—though limited—armored reserve: sufficient for reinforcing assault sectors and generating an operational reserve, but not enough for large-scale armored offensives in the classical sense.

Т-90М

Artillery remains the decisive resource. North Korean ammunition deliveries to Russia are estimated at 5.8 to 12 million shells. Combined with Russia’s own output, this stockpile is large enough to sustain high rates of fire for months. It is this artillery margin that enables Moscow to maintain a steady tempo of attacks, supporting incremental advances and keeping pressure on multiple axes simultaneously.

Russian fighters are shelling Ukrainian militants using a North Korean 107-mm MRL Type 75 mounted on a UAZ-469

Reserve Generation and the Political Framework

Manpower is another critical line of effort. In June 2025, Moscow issued a decree easing enlistment of recruits from CIS countries. By lowering bureaucratic and medical hurdles, the Kremlin created a faster pipeline to replace battlefield losses and draw in personnel with prior combat experience. In practice, this has opened an additional channel for covert mobilization.

Even more significant is the direct participation of North Korean forces. Since late 2024, DPRK units have been deployed to the combat zone and have taken an active role alongside Russian troops. This is not symbolic support but a fully committed contingent numbering in the tens of thousands. In 2025, Pyongyang formally confirmed plans to expand its presence—by some reports, an additional 25,000–30,000 troops. This positions North Korea as one of Moscow’s key battlefield allies: its forces both offset Russian personnel losses and reinforce assault reserves, assuming a substantial share of the burden in offensive operations.

Attention is also turning to the Zapad-2025 exercises, which Russia will conduct with Belarus in September. Officially framed as routine maneuvers, their scope and geography provide a platform for expanding infrastructure, rehearsing logistics, and refining staff coordination. For many observers, this is yet another sign that the Kremlin is laying the groundwork for larger-scale operations.

Warning Indicators in the Coming Weeks

Several observable trends could signal that Moscow is preparing to expand ground operations:

1. Increased frequency of assaults on fixed sectors— up to five to seven small-unit attacks per day, with efforts to consolidate gains.
2. Co-location of multiple armies and corps— deployment of diverse formations on a single axis suggests preparation for combined operations rather than isolated tactical moves.
3. Expansion of light mobility and engineering activity— more motorcycle/ATV detachments, along with new crossings and supply routes, would indicate intent to sustain a higher tempo for weeks, not days.
4. Continued pressure toward Pokrovsk while fixing forces in the northeast— classic shaping behavior to tie down Ukrainian units in one theater while probing another.

Constraints

Russia’s primary limitation is the difficulty of converting tactical successes into operational breakthroughs. Even as the number of assaults increases, most penetrations achieve only shallow depth, insufficient to dislocate Ukrainian defenses at scale. High casualty rates in small assault units further strain sustainability, requiring constant replenishment from mobilized personnel.

Logistical vulnerabilities also remain. Maintaining steady artillery fire and light-mechanized assaults depends on secure supply lines, engineering support, and resilient command-and-control networks—all of which remain vulnerable to Ukrainian long-range strikes and drones.

In effect, Russia’s model is optimized for attrition and incremental advances, but faces structural challenges in turning those into decisive results. This tension defines the outer boundary of Moscow’s operational optimism.

Interpreting the August 30 Statements

Gerasimov’s claim of “3,500 square kilometers and 149 settlements” is less about factual accuracy than about intent. The figures may be inflated, but the message is clear: Moscow is signaling that it has momentum and is prepared for a prolonged, grinding offensive.

The indicators align with this message—assaults are becoming more frequent, multiple formations are concentrating on key sectors, and the supply of armor and ammunition remains steady. These are classic warning signs that Russia is preparing to widen the scope of its campaign.

When that expansion begins, it will not take the form of a single dramatic armored thrust. Instead, it will manifest as a relentless, multi-directional advance that steadily erodes Ukrainian defenses. Sector by sector, positions will be stripped away until entire lines are at risk of collapse—a slow-moving storm gathering force across the front.

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