The Battle For Kherson: What Choices Will The Ukrainian Command Make

Reasons for the Russian garrison’s Withdrawal from Kherson in November 2022: How the city’s assault was prepared. Factors influencing the success of Ukrainian defense units. The difficulties the Russian Armed Forces might face in an offensive on Kherson.

The city of Kherson, located on the Dnipro River, acquired key strategic importance during military operations in southern Ukraine. Following the withdrawal of Russian troops from the right bank of the Kherson region in November 2022, the area was thrust back into the spotlight in autumn 2025. Russian troops strengthened their positions on the left bank and subsequently gained a foothold on Quarantine Island.

Reasons for the withdrawal of the Russian armed forces garrison

Fighting for Kherson began on 24 February 2022, the first day of Russia’s full-scale offensive in Ukraine. By 2 March 2022, the city had been captured by Russian military forces, making it the only regional center in Ukraine to fall under Russian control at that time. However, almost eight months later, the Russian command decided to withdraw its troops from the right bank of the Dnipro.

This decision, announced in November 2022, was influenced by several critical factors. Russian troops in the Kherson area were in an extremely vulnerable position due to their supply lines being stretched, mainly from Crimea. Ukrainian forces systematically damaged critical crossings across the Dnipro, primarily the Antonivskyi Bridge, as well as pontoon crossings, which were destroyed by HIMARS MLRS strikes. This almost completely disrupted the supply of ammunition, equipment and food to the Russian group on the right bank.

Sergey Surovikin, the commander of the Russian grouping of troops, stated that the decision to withdraw the garrison was «extremely difficult», but it allowed for the preservation of servicemen’s lives. The withdrawal was completed on 11 November 2022, after which Ukrainian troops entered the city without a fight.

Withdrawing troops to the left bank of the Dnipro allowed Russia to occupy a more stable defensive position along the natural water barrier. During the retreat, Russian troops blew up several bridges, further complicating any future offensive attempts from either side. While the return of Kherson was a significant political achievement for Ukraine, the city remained within range of Russian artillery and drone systems and continued to be shelled.

Preparation for the repeated assault on Kherson

Even before fighting for the islands intensified, the Ukrainian Armed Forces’ bridges, logistics and air defense systems were systematically struck to complicate the delivery of reserves and heavy equipment for Ukrainian units.

The expansion of control over the islands in the Dnipro delta was not limited to Quarantine Island alone. Russian units are operating across many of the islands in the lower reaches of the river, south of Kherson. The Russian Armed Forces previously established control over the « summer cottage villages» on these islands. This tactic aims to create a chain of strong points to disrupt the Ukrainian Armed Forces’ logistical routes and increase operational maneuverability in this area.

Particular attention is paid to a small, unnamed island located southwest of the city and surrounded by the Verevchina River. This area is considered a potential bridgehead for a future advance towards the villages of Kamyshany and Chornobaivka, home to the airport. The key task would be to intercept the M-14 highway.

The final stage in this process was to establish control over Quarantine Island. Having gained a foothold on the bridgehead, the Russian Armed Forces proceeded to clear the extensive industrial zone of the shipyard. Full control of this island is crucial and enables several tactical objectives to be achieved simultaneously. Firstly, it enables fire control to be established over the western part of Kherson and the surrounding area. Secondly, it disrupts the logistics of Ukrainian units since the bridges that previously connected different parts of the city passed through the island and have now been destroyed. Finally, it enables the Russian Armed Forces to deploy reconnaissance and electronic warfare (EW) assets to control adjacent water areas and territory.

The difficulties of city defense for the Ukrainian Armed Forces in the current reality

Ukrainian troops will have to deal with a range of issues relating to the defense of Kherson. The first of these is the lack of spare resources. The Russian command is putting pressure on several fronts (such as Kupiansk, Pokrovsk and Krasnyi Lyman) simultaneously to stretch the Ukrainian defense and prevent significant reserves from being concentrated on the Kherson front.

The second weak link in the defense of Kherson for the Ukrainian Armed Forces is logistics. The city and garrison are supplied along several highways. The main supply route for the Ukrainian forces is the M-14 highway, which leads to Mykolaiv. This vulnerable logistical artery is already under fire from Russian drones on Quarantine Island and other bridgeheads on the left bank of the Dnipro.

The third reason is the size of the Ukrainian garrison. The defense strategy is based on the fact that the Dnipro itself is a significant natural barrier. Therefore, the main forces can be concentrated on the approaches to the city rather than in the city itself. The city’s garrison includes drone units, which conduct reconnaissance and control the Dnipro water area, as well as territorial defense soldiers, who are responsible for defending the city’s boundaries.

The last serious problem is the absence of well-prepared defensive lines behind Kherson. The Ukrainian Armed Forces have no defensive lines behind Kherson, except for trenches on the border with the Mykolaiv region. If the defense along the Dnipro were to be broken through, this could open a path for advancement deep into the right-bank area.

Key difficulties for the Russian army in organizing an offensive

The main difficulty for Russian troops is crossing such a wide, fast-flowing river as the Dnipro. Large-scale amphibious operations are associated with enormous risks. Crossing units are extremely vulnerable to artillery, kamikaze drone and aircraft strikes. Even if a bridgehead is successfully established, organizing its supply requires reliable pontoon crossings or other logistical solutions, which will also be under constant fire.

A successful offensive on a well-fortified position held by limited forces requires significant superiority in manpower and equipment. A successful offensive can only be achieved by creating superiority in forces — this is a classic of military science. Creating such superiority on a narrow section of the front line, such as in the Kherson area, is difficult, as it requires the transfer of substantial reserves from other sections of the front line.

If Russian troops were to make a breakthrough across the Dnipro and approach the city, they would have to fight hard in an urban area. The Korabel microdistrict, where fighting is already taking place, is an industrial area comprising numerous shipyard workshops and other structures that could be converted into fortified strongpoints. Battles under such conditions usually result in slow progress and high losses for the attacking side.

Any large-scale offensive near Kherson would require significant forces to be concentrated there, which could weaken other sections of the front. Taking advantage of this, the Ukrainian command could intensify action in other areas, attempting to break through the Russian defense where it has been weakened. Therefore, gaining strategic initiative in one area could result in losing it in another.

Furthermore, recent events show that any attempts to concentrate troops are immediately detected by intelligence and subsequently subjected to massive missile and air strikes.

Conclusion

The situation around Kherson remains extremely tense, demonstrating the nature of modern combat operations where the balance of power is determined not only by the number of soldiers and tanks, but also by control over logistics, the use of advanced technology, and the ability to create strategic uncertainty. The events of autumn 2022 showed that territory that has been firmly held can be abandoned if it cannot be supplied. Currently, the Ukrainian Armed Forces are struggling to organize the defense of the city due to the vulnerability of their communications and limited reserves. Meanwhile, Russian troops have found it extremely difficult to force the Dnipro and storm a well-fortified city, despite having created bridgeheads on the islands. How events develop in the Kherson area will depend on whether either side can find effective solutions to these strategic and tactical challenges.

Activity in the Kherson area is forcing the Ukrainian Armed Forces to make difficult decisions about the distribution of their already limited reserves. Even limited successes by the Russian Armed Forces near Kherson could force Ukrainian forces to deploy scarce reserves, as well as firefighting teams, special forces, SSO units and drones, to the Kherson area to bolster defenses. This would allow Russian units to capture key cities such as Pokrovsk, Krasnyi Lyman and Kramatorsk.

Consequently, the Ukrainian Armed Forces are faced with a challenging decision: whether to reinforce the defense of one of the regional centers or to continue efforts to impede the Russian Armed Forces’ advance in other regions.

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