The Israeli Raid That Broke The Back Of The Syrian Arab Army

Illustrative image. (The Israeli Defense Forces)

When Israeli special forces landed near the town of Masyaf in western Syria late on September 8 of last year to raid an underground missile production site they didn’t likely know that they were setting course for a series of events that would ultimately bring in the end of the regime of President Bashar al-Assad, altering the balance of power in the Middle East for the foreseeable future.

The Israeli Defense Forces (IDF) has already shared some information about the raid, codenamed “Operation Deep Layer,” but in this report SouthFront will provide more details about what exactly went down on that night, and how the reaction of the Syrian Arab Army (SAA), or rather the lack of it, led to its dismay.

Israel only claimed responsibility for the raid on January 1, weeks after the fall of the Assad regime in an 11-day surprise rebel attack led by Islamists.

The IDF said that the missile production site was run by Syria’s Scientific Studies and Research Center, known as CERS or SSRC, and was used by Iranian forces to manufacture precision missiles for Hezbollah, which was engaged in a low-intensify conflict with Israel over its war on the Gaza Strip at the time of raid.

Sources with knowledge on the site and the Syrian investigation that followed the raid confirmed to SouthFront that CERS was producing missiles for Hezbollah there, but denied any direct involvement by Iran in the production. Tehran was only the financier, according to the sources.

The missile production equipment installed in the Masyaf site were originally operating in a larger, much more fortified complex of CERS located near the town of Safira in northern Syria, the sources said, noting that the equipment were moved early on during the war as rebels were closing in.

The daring raid in Masyaf was carried out by the special forces of the Israeli Air Force (IAF), known as Unit 5101 “Shaldag”.

The IDF had been monitoring the site for more than five years, targeting its facilities numerous times, although it identified that the strikes were not sufficient to target some of the underground infrastructure there.

During the September 8 raid, IAF commandos rappelled down from helicopters and raided CERS, killing the few guards standing at the entrance to the site, before heading deep underground to the missile manufacturing facility, according to the IDF.

The Syrian investigation was unable to determine how many helicopters exactly took part in the raid, but it found that at least one S-65C-3 heavy lift helicopter was involved and identified the IAF formation responsible as Unit 669.
Interestingly, the S-65C-3 didn’t only transport the commandos but also a buggy towing a trailer with steel cutting equipment. The equipment was used to break one of the site’s blast doors which was at least 300 mm thick. The buggy was destroyed by the commandos and left behind, likely to cut down weight.

The helicopters were briefly detected as they were approaching the Syrian coast from the direction of Lebanon, first by a Soviet-made S-75 medium-range air defense system in southern Tartus, then by a Chinese-made YLC-6 based in northern Lattakia. A third radar site based in western Homs, which was supposed to cover Masyaf specifically, failed to detect the helicopters due to jamming.

The sites in both Tartus and Lattakia informed the command of the Syrian Arab Air Defense Forces of the incoming helicopters. However, air defenses fell prey to Israeli aerial decoys which were deployed mainly between Tartus, Hama and Homs to cover up for the helicopters.

Just as the IDF said, the commands did engage in a firefight with the guards of the site, killing eight. Two others went into hiding and managed to survive.

But not everyone who was killed by the Israelis was a military personnel. As the helicopters were flying to the facility and during the raid, Israeli aircraft struck numerous targets in the surrounding area, including roads to the facility, reportedly killing at least 14 people and wounding 43. A man and his two sons were among those killed.

The strikes were intended to both mask the approach of the helicopters and the ground operation, as well as prevent anyone from reaching the facility, according to the IDF.

The commandos laid explosives inside the underground facility, before removing intelligence materials and documents and escaping unscathed.

Around an hour after landing, the commandos detonated remotely the underground site, along with the equipment inside. At this moment two technicians, who were the only people present inside the facility at the time of the raid, were killed.

Both technicians were able to hide from Israeli commandos near the site’s planetary mixer, which are used to mix chemicals for making missile solid fuel. The mixer actually appeared in footage released by the IDF.

The IDF said that some 120 commandos took part in the raid and that none of them were harmed. However, the sources that spoke to SouthFront said that empty blood bags and other first aid materials were found at the site after the raid.

According to the sources, the number of workers and guards of the site were constantly lowered in recent years in order to limit losses from repeated Israeli strikes.

However, no real defenses like heavy machine guns, man-portable air defense systems or mines were deployed near the site as a last line of defense.

The investigation found that one of the officials responsible for the site quickly understood that what was happening was an Israeli raid. He repeatedly requested the site to be attacked by the Syrian Arab Air Force, and even suggested for it to be targeted with ballistic missiles. Fighter jets were ready at the nearby Hama Air Base, and an OTR-21 Tochka tactical ballistic missile launcher was also deployed within range, but no orders were given.

The report produced by the investigation committee, which was headed by the Military Intelligence Directorate, was murky. Not a single official or officer was deemed responsible for negligence or treason. On top of that, no meaningful recommendations to prevent such events from recurring were provided.

The report did as much damage as the raid itself, as many within the SAA, lower and higher ranks, felt that their command was borderline encouraging negligence or worse.

What made things even worse was the leadership’s decision to completely censor all news related to the raid. With no official account of what happened, rumors took over and with rumors psychological warfare thrives. Some within the higher ranks of the SAA talked about a near collapse of the regime, while in the lower ranks, most lost faith in their leadership.

Later, it became clear that the raid was just the first of several moves Israel had prepared to deeply weaken the Assad regime and bring it down in order to isolate Hezbollah in Lebanon.

On September 17 and 18, Israeli intelligence blew up pagers and other communication devices used by Hezbollah in what became later known as Operation Grim Beeper. Later on September 23, the IDF launched Operation Northern Arrows, escalating the conflict with Lebanon into a fully-fledged war.

Then on September 27, a large blow came when Israel assassinated Hezbollah leader Hassan Nasrallah in an operation with a very straightforward name, New Order.

All in all, trust in the SAA reached its lowest point ever after the raid and with Hezbollah bugged down in Lebanon, the collapse of the Assad regime was around the corner. This materialized on December 8 when the military completely collapsed after just 11 days of fighting against the Islamist rebels, who ironically launched their attack on the day a ceasefire was announced in Lebanon.

Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu would later go on to hail the fall of the Assad regime, and boast about his role in bringing it down. Hezbollah from its side admitted that its supply routes were cut with the fall of the regime in Syria.

The country’s new Islamist rulers are now hunting down CERS workers and cracking down on any attempt to smuggle weapons to Hezbollah, all while engaging in talks with Israel.

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