ILLUSTRATIVE IMAGE
This post is based on a video of Razvedos YouTube channel (LINK) and comments to him released via Telegram (https://t.me/vladlentatarsky)
On April 24th, Razvedos published a new video, which gives an in-depth look at combat experience, and compares theory against practice.
Razvedos is a retired Russian special forces officer. In his video blog, he being a high professional provides overviews and analysis of various equipment, and methods and tactics of modern warfare.
The video is a conversation between a practitioner and a theoretician, in a way.
It looks whether the claims “theory without practice is dead” and “practice, without theory is unfeasible” hold any water.
The video began with an explanation that there is no “universal” type of experience, and that he (and anybody with an interest in the field) should be prepared to listen for hours upon hours to individuals with different kinds of experience.
He poses the question, what exactly is “combat experience”:
“The shelling began, the soldier laid in a ditch. Then the shelling ended, he climbed out of the ditch. Does such a fighter have combat experience?”
There is a fundamental difference between a soldier who suffered enemy fire and had to take cover, and a soldier who undertook specific combat missions and carried them out.
Several examples were given of various experience:
A man was in Chechnya, and for half a year he was deployed at a checkpoint, he saw no fighting, he never carried out any combat mission. But that man went to war, “went through it.” He “was there and he knows.”
He was shot at several times, from some unclear location in the brushes. His brother-in-arms went for a walk, and stepped on his own landmine. He pulled his brother-in-arms out, he saved him, and no was a result he has combat experience.
In terms of combat experience this person has two valuable lessons: how to serve at a checkpoint, and how not to aimlessly walk around in a warzone.
Another man was as a volunteer in Donbass (Eastern Ukraine), at first, he was, too, at a checkpoint. But then the line moved and he had to sit in trenches, and sometimes operate a mortar. He occasionally exchanged fire with the enemy over a distance of 1.5 – 2 kilometers.
This person teaches you what it means to live in a trench, while not being under intensive fire – but it can come at any moment.
And then there come people from Afghanistan, or Syria, and obviously their experience is incomparable, because there’s no two identical battlefields.
Furthermore, the given examples are the lucky ones. Some combat experience, such as that of some special operation forces “operators”, involves having to go into the mountains and hunt for terrorists.
What experience does he have? You suddenly come across the enemy, what you need to do, what equipment you’d need to even begin to carry out the mission, what to do in a close-quarters fight, at a distance of 30-50 meters, or even less.
And that person may have some valuable insight, for the situations he was in, and it is only conditionally valuable, in some situations.
Some of the people fighting terrorists tell of stories of the massive use of attack UAVs, so much as that an entire swarm attacks the squad at the same time, sometimes up to 20-30 drones. This is the situation in the low-intensity conflicts in the Middle East and throughout Africa.
Artillery isn’t even used, it’s all UAVs.
Unfortunately, the Russian Army has no such experience whatsoever. There is no experience of attack with the help of strike UAVs (as well as such UAVs themselves), thus there is little theory on how to effectively counter such a strategy on the battlefield.
And there’s nothing new in this, each fighter needs to have mastery over the weapons that his country has in its arsenal. Each soldier needs to undergo basic training, learn the vulnerabilities of the enemy, and so on.
Then they noted that the distances have increased, and in the infantry, there are units who possess weapons that allow killing the enemy over a long distance.
Therefore, it is necessary to additionally to train for the ability to effectively use:
- RPG-7, as well as RPG-22 and 26;
- GP-25, and other kinds of grenade launchers, too;
- PK – any 7.62×54mmR general-purpose machine gun;
- AGS-17 – and the ability to effectively operate a mortar, with the help of a sight;
- SPG-9 – tripod-mounted man-portable, 73 millimetre calibre recoilless gun;
- Utyos, NSV-12.7 – a 12.7mm caliber heavy machine gun;
- ATGMs – as they’re not exquisitely expensive, and there seems to be an abundance of them, and they also come in handy;
- Each infantryman must have the ability to detect mines, but also set mines. Defusing mines is the work for the sappers;
- Everyone should be able to adjust artillery fire with binoculars and a map.
There’s no “top-secret” training regimen, that would teach an individual all of this. This is basic training, and can be given by a non-war veteran instructor.
In order to have the ability to learn all of this, an individual needs to have the previous knowledge that there is such a thing as top leadership in an army, that thinks of strategy, and that the army isn’t simply a sort of group created for funny outfits and parades, and that there is also a time for that, but the primary goal is war.
No army entered any war prepared specifically for the war that began. The exceptions are the IDF (but they solve local problems) and the German army in WWII.
Modern Battalion Tactical Groups and Mechanized Infantry are simply updated version of what the Waffen-SS came up for World War II.
The problem of the military is that they are preparing for the past war, and not for the future.
So, the instructor who fought in a war will pass on his combat experience applicable to a specific military conflict.
Because, one person’s experience may dictate that intense enemy fire means the enemy is moving backwards, while somebody from the GRU who hunts terrorists would know that intense fire means the enemy is drawing closer.
There is no “one-size-fits-all” combat experience, and there’s no wrong or right, it’s all situational.
MORE ON THE TOPIC:
The key to any conflict is being able to impose your own combat strategy, it always succeeded in the ancient Romans, it also succeeded in the Red Army, this is the universal lesson on how wars are won.
I have seen vey good examples for the Russians has been not so at all.
Avery important number one also is to know who You are figting against, their strategy and use the correct soldiers for the job.
Tjetjenia was a very good example. The Russians toally ignored the very clever and advanced plans and the escalation in abelto fight in several levels for hard and for a long period.
The sended in russian new educated forced recuits and they were killed as blind rabbits. Several helicopeters was shot sown too as well as many armed vehicles was destriyed a la carte.
Russians should have retreated or waited once they got that very bad experiance and use harder professional troops.
It was the same for the last part. Russians had and has very good mountain troops, Even so they were not used . Instead their troops below in the valleys was killed random as well as all their equipment was very good supply by the Tjetjenians.
Whan the Russian Mountain Troops was landed in by many helicopters the victory came fast.
The lat very dirty part unfortunatly was same thing . So many soldiers having no idea about urvan warfare died for nothing as well as locals(Russian and Tjethenians).
So there are but but but in my knowledge level.
It was not the same in Afghanistan. The Russians invaded and was quite succesfull, but when the opponents went into using teh famaius Stingers and a lot of RPGs it was stupidity to insist in hard armered units still was the mwthod.
The classic thinking in that sometimes is, that if You use and armed and organised as Your enemies, You at least is a kind of 50:50. That never happend.
Its a military comment and not aput whats right or wrong for both wars as well as today.
So You are right about the Leadership for USSR was not impressing.
You are speaking of gobachev,as for russia without limiters,they easy dispatched nato and cia in georgia,the soviet eastern ukranians easily trounced kiev junta/west too easy infact,just like in crimea where discipline was proven the best in the world and as for the so called rabbits maybe you ought to see how easily communist fishermen dispatched many in tens of thousands us bunnies like in north korea where they failed.
Many good reflexions but I see a lot of armies and soldiers not even able to use Von Clusewitch in its bests at WW2.
The auhor also forget the soldiers are not raised robots from 0 program to be good or bad soldiers. The start is they are raised 18 years. A typical reflexion is, that the more indivisule and independent people are raise, the more they are able to adapt and act fast and well in smaller but united groups.
Here Russians and muslims in fx Syria and Iraq are very very bad. They have learned to obey olders and always are kept under control. If they are not under good control, they think they are off duty or dont do vital and important things.
Danes are teachers in those problems in Iraq beingg a part of the Nato help. We learn individuels operating in groups of 10 to act dast and correct and being very mobile. The low ranked officer being independent acting is the key and not the ones above them.
Facts are real – as the lined up in the article – but the article seemes to forget the enemies handling those weapons are moving them around fast and well, so soldiers reflecting well against it is only one part of it.
By that the soldiers has to act as a group helping each other, where there are good Leadership but alos single independency with no need for that – and not fx running away or “duck”.
Germans in fighting had more democrasy then USA and GB. The german low ranked officer as well as above that was OBLIGATED to listen to all as well listen well by the war manual. German soldiers(when the army of theirs still looked nice) and their officers was raised together in their units and the german officers based the war jobs by consensus knowing group dyamics(which soldiers work well with other soldeirs in even smaller groups).
In hard times by orders from above the low ranked officers asked all what to do.telling I can propose A and B. Do You have something better. By that the decission had consensus fx saying “We all know 20 or 30% will die” but followed by determaination. I again add, that orders from above sometimes was suice orders so to speak.
But thats the main difference to the fighters from YPG´+J and ISIS to most of the rest in the ME fightings. Those are Guerillia raised being outnumbered and being in smal comander groups acting fast being with many others for a short while, fight and then retreat out sof sight and no where for anybody else( Like ISIS in the deserts and towns right now).
Thats classic Clusewich using the opportunities and NOT being punished when it goes very wrong now and that.
Nazis did that very well in divison and Armê seize well too.
But as indicated here in the article above, the soldiers and the units also has to be divided as in a kiosk or shop like buying food for a meal rasying what do we need to be succesfull chiefs and cooks and then know exact how any potatoes, salt pepper and meat.
So whe You count soldiers, they as written above, do very difficult jobs and not only for fighting but the most important things might not even be the fighting each self. Here guards unuse to anything but some few bullits here and there, but one of the most imprtant thing is, that soldiers cant fight with no bullets, no fue, no water, no food and it has to be there. You dont need high class fighters by those jobs even its a very good idea the can shoor and be a reserve.
What do you know about fighting,you have no cles fo you ,fk no,the fact when you are told there is no option but to come back either dead or both missing legs thats the only way,then ponder how in ww2 communist greece ousted the overhyped nazis in 221 days do no you don’t know anything but kweer hype as for the case in real hands on + unarmed combat it’s not the size of the dog that matters but rather the size of the fight in the dog that matters,this is why cccp once given full speed ahead,averaged 25kms per day pushing 70% of the nazis,compared to the wests combined averaging 2.5 kms per day of the 30% which clearly suggests 20x more efficiency to say the very least,for your information with ye nazi assfloggeds they were overhyped pussys on big drugs and wekk prepared first strike stategys taking advantage of the other more emphatic nature,thus why ye fekn incest spawners got flogged!
As the old saying goes,never try to mess with what or whom ye don’t know,nasis were dumbed!
“We learn individuels operating in groups of 10 to act dast and correct and being very mobile.”
So this is great. I’ll take your word for it that the Danes are the pinnacle of squad tactic mastery.
The Danes can field about 12,000 troops. That is a small division in total. There is no possible way for the Danes to master division let alone army level tactics.
Good luck with your super squad that is so independent and mobile.
only an idiot believes democracy should apply to militaries—only a fool argues w a fool