Trump War With Deep State Is About Increasing His Own Powers

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Written by Uriel Araujo, PhD, anthropology researcher with a focus on international and ethnic conflicts

Much is being talked about how US newly elected President Donald Trump is supposedly at war with the “Deep State” (and the intelligence apparatus) – because of the announcements made pertaining to his nomination choices for some key US government positions. While he has named “outsiders” for the post of Director of National Intelligence (DNI), and to head the Pentagon, and amazingly the CIA, he has also chosen hawkish Senator Marcos Rubio to lead the Department of State.

Trump has tapped Tulsi Gabbard (former Democrat Congresswoman) as DNI. She is on record stating that Washington had no business interfering in Syria and that Russian President Vladimir Putin had his reasons to launch the Russian campaign in Ukraine. Such views are considered radical or even heresy within the American Establishment. Gabbard however has little experience with intelligence work.

The name of Pete Hegseth, Trump’s nominee for Secretary of Defense has also sparked controversy among the military. The 44-year-old Fox News host and Army National Guard who will be heading the Pentagon has been described by Paul Rieckhoff (founder of Independent Veterans of America) as “the least qualified nominee for SecDef in American history.” Finally, there is John Ratcliffe (former DNI), appointed to serve as CIA director. He is basically seen as a fierce Trump loyalist, and is accused by US hawks of being too “soft” on Russia (albeit being a “China hawk”).

Reid Smith (Foreign Policy Vice President) and Dan Caldwell (Public Policy Adviser at Defense Priorities), argue in their Foreign Policy piece that “the United States has overreached in its foreign policy and must correct course”, and that Donald Trump’s presidency could be the way out of it. They warn that the “Republican Party should embrace Trump’s ‘art of the deal’ foreign policy approach” of “tough-minded diplomacy” (focusing on “diplomatic dealmaking”) rather than a “neoconservative foreign policy consensus”, which focuses on intervention and warfare.

The US, after all, they argue, has reached, after two decades of “military entanglements”, a state of “battle fatigue”, and also “operates in a world of constraints”, with a limited industrial capacity. Thus “America First” should mean “a commitment to realism and restraint”, and the Grand Old Party (GOP), as the Republican Party is often called, should prioritize “American interests over maintaining the hegemony of liberal values worldwide.”

It all sounds quite merry and optimistic, and makes sense, considering some of Donald Trump’s aforementioned nominations. The announcement of Rubio’s nomination, however (together with other China hawks), should make anyone skeptical about Washington exercising much restraint under Trump. For one thing, with Rubio, the risk of further American interventions in Venezuela and Latin America in general will increase – which confirms what I wrote last week about Monroeism being the other side of Trump’s supposed isolationism. The choice of Rubio seems to “balance” the names of Ratcliffe, Hegseth and Gabbard. It also sends a clear message and seems to be a way to “appease” the diplomatic-military Establishment

In the US, the Secretary of State (SecState) is analogous to a Minister of Foreign Affairs or a Chancellor in other countries. He or she heads the Department of State (responsible for the country’s foreign policy and relations), and is the second-highest-ranking member of the president’s Cabinet, after the vice president, ranking fourth in the presidential line of succession. It is often said that no two US agencies work “more closely together” (in foreign nations) than the Department of State and the CIA.

Moreover, according to Joseph W. Wippl (former CIA officer and International Relations professor at the Boston University), “some CIA responsibilities cover identical areas of reporting by the Department of State, but through clandestine means rather than official contacts”. He adds: “in my extensive experience, the greatest beneficial effect on policy came when State and CIA reporting dovetailed. Common positions did not always occur, and tension between the two agencies resulted when there were differences.”

If the Secretary of State is an Establishment “hard-liner” hawk while the Director of National Intelligence, and other appointees are “doves” (on Syria and other issues) or radical outsiders and loyalists, then internal conflict is bound to occur within the intelligence community, and the high echelons of the bureaucracy. That can compromise governability. In this way, exercising any amount of restraint in foreign policy will be a challenge – and doing just the opposite will be a challenge too.

Rather than a “rupture” or breaking with an interventionist foreign policy, the choice of Marco Rubio signals continuity with it. Trump’s choices (other than Rubio) are ideology and loyalty-oriented – they are also questionable in terms of curriculum, expertise, and qualifications. But they do seem to signal a rupture. How can one make sense of it?

While no one can be sure Trump will actually deliver a more “restrained” foreign policy (as promised and as Reid Smith and Dan Caldwell hope), what one can be sure of is that Trump will attempt to “tame” the intelligence services so as to be able to better advance his own political and personal goals. This is first and foremost about increasing presidential powers, which is in line with Trump’s whole agenda of expanding the Executive, as outlined in Project 2025.

In Trump v. United States, the Supreme Court has already ruled that the President cannot be criminally prosecuted for “official acts”, and such immunity provides him with a firm ground to pursue such an agenda. US Presidents are already temporary de jure dictators when it comes to foreign policy (for example, they can actually wage in warfare without Congress approval), but they are of course constrained in practice by the “Deep State”. Trump wants to turn Presidents into near-dictators when it comes to domestic policy too – and while he is at it, he also wants to challenge the Deep State. Those are too bold goals for anyone – even for someone who is so well positioned and empowered as Trump currently is.

Moreover, historically, whenever an American President attempted to tame the intelligence services, it never ended well. Kennedy, Johnson, Nixon, and Ford all distrusted the CIA – eventually they all learned to live with it – except Nixon, who was ousted; and Kennedy, who famously declared he would “splinter the CIA into a thousand pieces and scatter it into the winds”. Kennedy’s assassination remains unexplained to this day.

Considering the many failures the Secret Service displayed with regards to Trump’s assassination attempt in Pennsylvania (during the presidential election campaign) not to mention the inconsistencies, the newly elected US President could be in a very vulnerable position if he attempts to challenge too much the so-called deep state – especially considering the American record when it comes to intrigue and assassin attempts against officials.

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