Turkish-Israeli Relations Heavily Damaged

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Written by Uriel Araujo, researcher with a focus on international and ethnic conflicts

Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan said on October 25 he is canceling plans to visit Israel over its “inhumane” war in Palestine. He also called for an immediate ceasefire, and added that “Hamas is not a terrorist organization, it is a liberation group.”

Since last year, Israeli-Turkish bilateral ties, which include intelligence and security cooperation, had been improving, after a number of frictions that go way back. It has in fact been a shaky back-and-forth relationship for years. The two countries had restored their ties in 2016, but Israeli envoys were once again dismissed from Turkey in the aftermath of Israel’s use of deadly force against demonstrators during the 2018 Gaza border protests. The latest developments in all likelihood shall put Turkish-Israeli relations back in the freezer.

Since the 2020 Abraham Accords, a number of Arab states have normalized their relations with Tel Aviv and, in some cases, even went on to deepen strategic cooperation agreements – Saudi Arabia potentially being the next one in line. The Hamas-Israel war might have changed everything. In any case, it is true that from the very beginning such normalization deals have heightened tensions domestically not only in the Arab world, but also in the wider Middle East region and beyond, even in Sub-Saharan Africa (even amid non-Muslim countries), triggering demonstrations and polarizing public opinion over the issue of Palestine. Things are not different when it comes to Turkey, and thus current massive demonstrations might have also played a role in Erdogan’s decision to call off a trip to Israel.

After the Jewish state has been striking Gaza and the West Bank in Palestine (as a response to Hamas’ October 7 unprecedented violent attacks), massive demonstrations have been held across Istanbul and Ankara, as has also been the case in many cities in Europe and abroad. Over security concerns, the Israeli authorities in Tel Aviv withdrew all their diplomats from Turkey on October 19, amid massive pro-Palestinian demonstrations in the country.

Gaza, the main target of an indiscriminate bombing campaign, is home to over 2 million Palestinians. Strikes thus far have killed a total of at least 4,000 Palestinians in Gaza alone. Such a conflict thus risks escalating and spilling into the wider Middle East. Such a massive military campaign and the ensuing humanitarian catastrophe has understandably been the target of heavy criticism worldwide, this being the context for latest protests in Turkey and elsewhere.

Until quite recently, some observers argued that Turkey was very well positioned to mediate between Israel and Hamas, it being a player that maintains relations with both actors. Taha Ozhan, research director at the Ankara Institute, for instance, highlighted the fact that “Turkey has a good communication channel with Hamas, which is an important asset.” Erdogan had, in fact, until recently, insistently stepped forward as a potential mediator. The Turkish president and Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu met in person for the first time on September 19 during the annual high-level United Nations General Assembly. Turkish-Israeli energy agreements have recently been announced, and Ankara has been eyeing joining a US-backed natural gas pipeline in Israel, but all of that and the future of such cooperation is now uncertain. Erdogan has recently stated that “of course, we had good intentions, but [Netanyahu] abused them,” adding that “if he had continued with good intentions, our relations might have been different, but now, unfortunately, this will not happen either.”

Turkey’s (now stalled) plans to enhance ties with Israel were part of Ankara’s complex diplomacy. The last few years marked a new approach trend in Turkish foreign policy. In September 2021, I wrote on how Erdogan had been pursuing rapprochement with traditional adversaries, such as the UAE, Egypt and Saudi Arabia.

While Ankara aspires to be a global player, it also seeks to be the leader of a broader Islamic world that also includes lands where Turkic ethnicities live (even as minorities), beyond the religious issue. As I wrote, Turkish Neo-Ottomanist ambitions threaten peace in Central Asia, the Middle East, and even beyond.

In March 2022, I argued that any future Turkish-Israeli strategic cooperation was a far cry, despite Erdogan’s initiatives towards such a goal: the Jewish state’s relations with Greece and also France which disputes Eastern Mediterranean dominance with Ankara are a complicating factor in this equation. I added that Ankara’s sophisticated foreign policy seemed to aspire to embrace everything: from North Africa to the South Caucasus, all the while regulating its competition with Russia, and also leveraging its influence within NATO. Those are all very complex bilateral relations to navigate, I concluded. That remains even truer today. Ties between Tel Aviv and Ankara, as we have seen, are actually quite fragile and, arguably, so are the latter’s ties with the West, despite recent developments.

On October 23, Erdogan submitted a bill approving Sweden’s NATO membership bid to parliament, making the Nordic country one step closer to being a member of the Atlantic Alliance. This further consolidates NATO expansion, a process that has been going on for years and is one of the main causes of today’s crisis in Ukraine. Turkey had long been blocking Sweden’s accession (which Washington has been pushing) over US support for Kurdish rebel groups in Syria, as I wrote.

NATO Secretary-General Jens Stoltenberg in fact recently created the post of Special Coordinator for Counter-Terrorism and has admitted this “was Turkey’s request.” Stoltenberg has praised Mr. Erdogan‘s move regarding Sweden’s bid. Erdogan’s take on Israel and Hamas, particularly, has the potential to further sour his relations with Washington and the political West in general. It has already estranged Erdogan from the US, according to Henri J. Barkey, a CFR senior fellow. It seems the Turkish leader found that not taking such a stance (regarding Palestine) would cost him more, domestically and regionally.

Deepening cooperation with Tel Aviv might be strategically interesting for a number of states for various reasons, but it might have a political cost domestically, especially in the case of Muslim nations, and this is particularly true today. Israel counts on American and European support, but is becoming increasingly isolated. Turkey, which also faces its own challenges in terms of foreign relations might try to exploit the issue of Palestine to further project its influence in the Muslim world, in accordance with its ambitious goals.