Five months into the war between the United States and Iran, one decision has shaped the conflict more than any other: Iran’s choice to make the Strait of Hormuz, not its missile arsenal or its network of allies, the center of its response. That choice was not automatic. Iran had three ways to hit back, and it has used all three to different degrees — but only one has become the war’s main axis. Understanding why explains most of what has happened since.
The Options
Iran’s most direct option was to keep firing missiles and drones at U.S. bases and Israel, and it has done so throughout the war, hitting military assets, energy infrastructure and civilian sites. By some estimates, it has struck its Gulf Arab neighbors even more heavily than Israel itself.
This option has imposed a real and mounting cost on the U.S. and its allies. U.S. and allied air defenses have intercepted the large majority of what Iran has fired, and that success has come at a price: Patriot interceptor inventories have fallen below 1,000 and THAAD inventories to about 250, according to the Center for Strategic and International Studies. That drawdown has forced the Trump administration to request $95 billion for munitions in the fiscal 2027 defense budget, plus another $21 billion in war-related supplemental funding.
Yet the calculus isn’t one-sided. Iran’s strikes have not stopped and continuing the campaign has cost Iran regionally. The United Arab Emirates, which has taken some of the heaviest attacks, has hardened toward Iran and moved closer to security cooperation with Israel. Other Gulf states have grown warier of Tehran, too, even where they’re reluctant to be seen siding openly with Israel.
Iran’s second option — covert or sabotage operations against Western targets — has stayed mostly unused. That’s notable given Iran’s network of allies and history, and given that the war has struck at Iran’s leadership directly, including the killing of Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei.
The restraint looks deliberate rather than forced. An attack on Western civilians risks cementing Iran’s designation as a state sponsor of terrorism at a moment when Tehran is trying to hold together sympathy from Russia, China and parts of the Global South. Iran may also simply not need the added risk while its other options are already raising costs for Washington. That restraint isn’t necessarily permanent.
The Decision
Against that backdrop, the Strait of Hormuz stands out as the option that costs Iran the least and delivers the most. Iran controls the entire northern shore of the strait, through which roughly a fifth of the world’s seaborne oil passes, and can threaten it with coastal missiles, small boats, drones and mines — assets that don’t depend on the conventional navy or air force the war has been steadily grinding down.
Unlike a missile campaign that burns through stockpiles on both sides, or a sabotage campaign that risks a reputational cost Iran doesn’t want to pay, the strait lets Iran apply pressure cheaply, deniably and indefinitely.
Iran began laying mines there in March. It didn’t need to lay many. The threat alone pushed oil above $100 a barrel for the first time since 2022 and added roughly 50 cents a gallon to U.S. gasoline prices within a week. Prices have swung as high as $120 a barrel since, and tanker strikes tied to mines were still being reported this month.
Shipping insurers have responded by pulling coverage or raising rates high enough that companies simply stop sending vessels through — achieving much of the effect of a blockade without Iran needing to fight one outright.
It is also the one option the U.S. cannot resolve from the air. The threat is spread along hundreds of miles of coastline rather than concentrated in fixed sites, so strikes can degrade it temporarily but not eliminate it. Keeping the strait reliably open would require controlling that coastline directly, and neither the U.S. troop presence in the region — built for limited raids, not occupation — nor the political appetite in Washington supports that.
That asymmetry is the reason the strait, and not missiles or sabotage, has become Iran’s defining move: it’s the one option that gets cheaper for Iran to sustain the longer the war runs, while the other two get more expensive or more risky.
The Reality
None of this was unforeseeable. Before the war began, Gulf Arab governments — the states most exposed to exactly this kind of retaliation — told Washington directly that they opposed an attack on Iran, and some restricted U.S. use of their airspace and territory in the lead-up to it.
Their objections tracked closely with what followed: a still-armed Iran turning its missile and drone stockpiles on the region, mining and closing the strait their economies depend on, and holding a sabotage capability in reserve rather than using it outright. The interceptor drawdown, the strait’s vulnerability and Iran’s history of using its allies over direct attacks were all documented risks before the first strike was launched.
The war has not produced a surprising outcome. It has produced the one that was predicted — with Iran, given a choice among three costly options, picking the one that cost it the least.
Beyond supporting Israel, the U.S. may have entered the war to advance the interests of its elites. Weakening the Gulf states would heighten their dependence on Washington, leading to higher military spending from which American defense contractors would profit the most. At the same time, although rising energy prices hurt ordinary Americans, certain companies are undoubtedly benefiting.
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